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 A 21-year old Yale Graduate with a diploma in his hand set up on a dangerous expedition 
to British controlled Long Island. No man except the bravest of the brave would be bold enough 
to depart on that journey. Merciless smugglers, deserters, and gunrunners, both rebels and 
redcoats or just acting for themselves, controlled the pond and the land surrounding it. Their 
monopoly often challenged by the British Royal Navy that was scouting for the rebel privateers 
and sometimes, but very rarely, for British refugees crossing the Sound under the flag of truce. 
From all these British sailors and officers, the rebels were particularly afraid of a notorious 
captain William Quarme who was in charge of the sixteen-gun brig Halifax and was very often 
accompanied on his voyages by the ruthless Queens Rangers. Even if they were able to avoid the 
contact with the Halifax or other ships, Patriots knew that their journey and intentions had to be 
hidden from their colleagues, friends, and family to avoid being caught by the British informers.1 
However, this young and brave boy decided that nothing was going to stop him from traversing 
the Sound, so he left the comforts of his community and embarked on a journey that he knew 
might be fatal.  
 Under the cover of darkness, on September 16, 1776, the American four-gun sloop 
Schuyler and fourteen-gun Montgomery, had weighed anchor near Long Island’s north shore and 
rowed our brave boy ashore, and the two ships were able to move far away from the coast to a 
distance that was enough away to discourage any attempt of Halifax for the pursuit before the 
dawn would reveal their presence.2 However, Patriot’s clandestine voyage was noticed by 
Quarme and, according to the Halifax’s logbook, he “sent the tenders and boats armd to search 
the [Huntington] Bay for two rebel privateers having interlagence of them,” but the next day, 
around 6 p.m, “the tenders and boats returned not being able to find any rebel privateers.”3 
However, one man on the Halifax could not accept the scouts’ report and was more than 
convinced that something fishy was going on. The latter’s “senses sharpened by decades as a 
frontiersman, warrior, and ranger” were telling him that Schuyler’s and Montgomery’s 
maneuvers were not ordinary.4  
 With one person left on Long Island on the unspecified mission and one person 
wondering why two American ships were near the British controlled shore, it is time to expand 
this narrative and identify both people. The youngster’s name was Nathan Hale who was on a 
mission to collect intelligence on the British forces on Long Island, and the name of the men 
aboard Halifax, was Robert Rogers of the Queens Rangers (aka Roger’s Rangers), a merciless 
soldier influenced by the tragic childhood experience and unsuccessful business endeavors.  
 After landing on the Long Island shore, Nathan Hale, “improved in disguise,” as a Tory 
storekeeper in Connecticut, Consider Tiffany, notes, and unaware of Robert Rogers’ suspicion, 
had started his clandestine journey “to find whether the Long Island inhabitants were friends to 
America or not,” but soon realized that the British troops movements indicated that the invasion 
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of Manhattan was coming up and that his original mission, as noted by Kenneth A. Daigler, 
“were being overtaken by events.”5 Apparently, he decided to quit his mission and return back to 
the American lines, but his actions and methods of collecting intelligence “were suspicious 
enough to draw attention” on the young fellow with intention to get a teaching job in the British 
controlled territory, filled with refugees from the American lines, who might know Hale or heard 
some rumor about his endeavor.6 However, he was unable to hide from Robert Rogers, who had 
an immense reconnaissance experience, and whose guts were telling him that the rebels 
infiltrated a spy into the British territory.  
 Robert Rogers knew that any rebel spy would have to move along the coast to reach the 
friendly lines so “in mid-morning on September 18, Rogers landed at Sands Point, Long Island, 
and started on the trail of the spy.”7 After observing and following Nathan Hale for a few days, 
Rogers determined that it was a time to confirm his suspicions and had a bright idea to catch the 
spy in the lie. According to Consider Tiffany, “to convince himself,” Rogers decided to try “the 
same method, he quickly altered his own habit, with which he made Capt Hale a visit to his 
quarters, where the Colonel fell into some discourse concerning the war, intimating the trouble of 
his mind, in his being detained on an island, where the inhabitants sided with the Britains against 
the American Colonies, intimating withal, that he himself was upon the business of spying out 
the inclination of the people and motion of the British troops.”8 After hearing stranger’s story, 
which was credible to Hale, and feeling home-sick and lonely, our young fellow decided to tell 
the trusted friend, Robert Rogers, his secret.  
 After learning about Hale’s business, Colonel Rogers chose to invite our brave boy “to 
dine with him the next day at his quarters, unto which he agreed,” but he was unaware that the 
purpose of the latter meal was to push him to expose his secret in front of the witnesses so his 
arrest and punishment might be just. “The time being come, Capt Hale repaired to the place 
agreed on, where he met his pretended friend, with three or four men of the same stamp, and 
after being refreshed, began the same conversation as hath been already mentioned,” but Hale 
unaware of trap and soldiers outside of the barn, eagerly retold his story and was with the 
equivalent passion, but not his own, arrested and sent to New York.9 
  After realizing what had just had happened, Nathan Hale tried to deny “his name, and the 
business he came upon,” but was unable to convince anyone of his innocence, especially after his 
identity was confirmed by “the several persons,” and the incriminated documents were found in 
the soles of his shoes, and “was hanged as a spy, some say without being brought before a court-
martial.”10 Consider Tiffany was not wrong, Hale’s guilt as a spy was evident, and General 
Howe immediately signed Hale’s death warrant. The next morning, Nathan Hale was “marched 
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to an artillery park next to the Dove Tavern and placed atop a ladder with a rope around his neck 
connected to a tree branch.”11 
 Nathan Hale’s life is a story of a brave Patriot that still resonates in American minds and 
have become an everlasting symbol of individual’s willingness to sacrifice his life for the cause 
that was foreign to many inhabitants of the world and the country that was still too young, and 
mainly unknown to the brave martyr. Nathan Hale’s last words “I only regret that I have but one 
life to lose for my country,” which are from the famous play of that period, Cato, by Joseph 
Addison and were probably ascribed to Hale by his friends in the years after the execution (the 
same as Shakespeare’s words were to Caesar), have become the most famous words in the 
American history. Nathan Hale’s story “is more drama than fact,” as Kenneth A. Daigler argues, 
but it is significant for the historians of the intelligence.12 It shows the capacity of the British 
counterintelligence at the beginning of the war, specifically some of the officers, and, at the same 
time, provides us with the extraordinary case study that not only helps us to reconstruct the 
development of the American intelligence service but also understanding of the revolutionary 
leaders’ strategy.  
 Hale did not act on his own, nor he was sent onto his clandestine journey by some rank 
and file; instead, he volunteered to take the assignment when no one from his regiment was 
willing to do it and had received operation orders from the commander in chief himself. With 
that in mind, the operation showed the immatureness of the Patriots’ intelligence and its capacity 
to successfully infiltrate its agent into the epicenter of the British military activity, a weakness 
that was immeasurable, especially when we now know that the American outposts in Europe, 
especially one in Paris, were profoundly and successfully penetrated with the people of 
questionable loyalties and connections to the crown.  
 According to Kenneth A. Daigler, “for an intelligence activity to be successful, its 
planning must be well thought out, with careful attention to all details of the activity.” The agent 
has to have a credible cover that would survive every scrutiny and have alternative plans ready if 
the initial one does not go as it was planned. Moreover, he has to have access to the safe house, 
have a way to collect and dispatch intelligence reports without raising any suspicion. Finally, 
“both the entry into enemy territory and the return to the friendly territory should be carefully 
planned and timed, with backup arrangements also in place.”13  
 The biggest of all mistakes was that Nathan Hale was sent to the British lines with the 
cover of the schoolteacher. First, Hale’s superiors allowed him to operate under his real name. 
Even though they believed, apparently were convinced by Hale to think so, that his education 
background and his Yale diploma might strengthen his schoolteacher cover, they did not realize 
the weaknesses of the same legend. On Long Island there were many refugees who fled from the 
American Lines who might have been acquainted with Nathan Hale or might be able to 
recognize that name from some gossip or even from the street, especially after he was stationed 
in New York City during the American occupation and had “a powder burn from a musket-flash 
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accident on his right cheek,”14which was interesting characteristic for someone who claimed to 
be a teacher. Almost every American family during that war had members on both sides of the 
conflict who might be suspicious of their kin’s presence in the British territory. We know that 
Hale’s cousin was a senior British officer who was well aware of Hale’s membership in the 
Continental Army. Hale also had a problem with blending into cover because of his above-
average height.15 
 Second, Hale was sent to Long Island in September when the academic year had already 
started and “considering the interest most British soldiers of the time had in any intellectual 
pursuit, his stated purpose for wandering around the camps and fortifications was not very 
convincing."16Moreover, he was openly taking notes, which he would hide in the soles of his 
shoes, and discussing with the inhabitants about the news of the day. If he was pretending to be 
looking for a teaching job, why did he wander around the military posts and write his notes on 
the blank paper instead of taking notes and concealing the intelligence on the margin of the 
books that every teacher would carry with him? There were many more operational, such as 
recruiting agent publicly within the regiment without bothering about moles that might have 
been infiltrated by the enemy, and tactical mistakes, such as Hale’s natural inability to lie and his 
everlasting trust in people’s honesty, that both Hale and his superior overlooked.17  
 Now, it might be strange to some that the general who was introduced to the clandestine 
activities during the French and Indian War and was not only able to learn from British 
intelligence failures during that war but also enemies’, would command such amateurish 
operation. Even though Washington learned a lot about the clandestine activities during the latter 
conflict, his knowledge was still basic, and, at the beginning of the War for Independence, his 
main priority was the organization of the Continental Army and discipline among soldiers. 
Indeed, he did try to open some communication channels for intelligence and start some 
necessary collection activities, as Nathan Hale example clearly shows, but he knew that “a more 
focused and disciplined approach to his intelligence activities would have to wait until he got his 
army somewhat organized,”18as Kenneth A. Daigler argues. Still we have to keep in mind that 
Nathan Hale’s expedition and its outcome not only gave Washington an opportunity to learn 
from his mistakes and to improve the intelligence collection but, at the same time, proved that he 
“possessed a mind and nature-oriented toward the intelligence discipline,”19 and an aspiration to 
become the founder of the American intelligence collection, a title that he will earn in the 
coming years of the war.  
During the Revolutionary War, the Commander in Chief would establish the secret 
service and tactics that would be almost foreign to the enemies. The extraordinary success of 
American spies is solely Washington’s who was the principal architect of all operations that his 
agents undertook. At the same time, Washington was the chief intelligence officer and the 
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primary consumer. According to Daigler, “with both these responsibilities, he was able to direct 
his collection efforts on what he wanted and needed to know, rather than what could readily be 
collected.”20 The latter allowed him to cross-reference every intelligence received from his 
civilian assets with the tactical reports submitted to his headquarters by his officers and soldiers. 
It is an easy task to identify Washington’s role in all of this, but one question that remains and 
that is the focus of this work is the question of recruitment.  
When George Washington asked thirty-seven-year-old Lieutenant Thomas Knowlton to 
recruit some soldiers for the intelligence service from amongst his men, nobody wanted to do it 
because the world of spies was murky and would destroy gentlemen’s honor, which was 
cherished so dearly by the people at that time. As mentioned before, Nathan Hale was the only 
member of the Knowlton’s Rangers who was willing to undertake this endeavor, but not because 
he was driven by a self-interest nor desire for money but because he just wanted to serve and be 
an active member of the team. He told his friend, William Hull, that he “thought he owed to his 
country the accomplishment of an object so important and so much desired by the commander of 
her armies,”21and he firmly stated that “if the exigencies of my country demand a peculiar 
service its claims to perform that service are imperious.”22  He felt like he hasn’t done anything 
for his country for a year, and spying allowed him to do something that will make a difference. 
He asked himself a straightforward question: “If not me then who?” Every patriot and soldier 
who was called to serve would probably feel the same. If the ideology was the main factor that 
induced Hale to serve the cause, what did motivate others to join Washington in the 
outmaneuvering the enemy? Why would some people choose to overlook their apparent 
differences, ethnicity, religion, gender, and race, and risked being hung to participate in 
something where the outcome was not certain? Could they have sensed a moment in history was 
larger than they were and felt premonition of the new country before it was born? 
Due to the complex and vibrant environment, a single answer is not possible. The Anglo-
American conflict was not as French nor Russian Revolution; instead, it was a gradual 
transformation of individual social and political views. The British aggressive imperial policies 
had a significant impact on the colonial routine. The quasi-independent political environment 
and accustomated economic dealings were suddenly coming under stricter control of the 
Westminster. These actions were the antithesis to the constitutional rights of the British subjects 
and personal want, and people started wondering whether they held the same status as the 
residents of the British Isle. The colonial legislatures, acting for the whole dominion, sent 
numerous grievances to the Crown, but the ignorance, stubbornness, and want for mastery 
prevented London from grasping and accepting colonial reasoning. In this environment, the 
radical ideas, championed by a small group of people, were slowly gaining momentum and 
becoming a refuge from, and suddenly an alternative to, the British imperialistic policies. This 
process would not stop when the new American life was conceptualized in 1776; instead, the 
British atrocities on the battlefield and conditions in the occupied territory would keep it alive. 
The Revolution and War for Independence were ideological in nature, but, at the same time, 
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interwoven with personal motivations and experience. Almost all colonials were driven to 
consider joining the cause by the dominant psychological adjustments, but their internal 
motivations pushed them to cut permanently their ties with the crown. 
Therefore, if we must distill a single factor for spying during the Revolution, the 
traditional motives—money, ideology, coercion/compromise, and ego (‘MICE’)—would be the 
most accurate. With the ideological motivation more dominant on the side of George 
Washington and fellow Patriots, and monetary on the British. However, these factors should not 
be seen as singular motivators. They were interwoven with spies’ personal experiences, desires, 
and grievances.  
Now, let us look at members of the most successful George Washington’s spy ring, the 
Culper Ring, and understand more deeply why they decided to join the cause and did what they 
did. However, before we do that, we have to understand more clearly the political and social 
problems that induced the emergence of the movement for the independence of British America 
and, ultimately, the new nation.  
I. The Origins of the American Revolution: Problems, Decisions, and 
Outcomes that impacted many inhabitants of British America  
 
 The leading cause of the Revolution as we all know was the question of the Parliament's 
jurisdiction in the colonies, but that cannot be discussed in isolation. 23Legitimate but at the same 
time illogical and arrogant British government's actions created an environment in which liberal 
ideas, which were championed by the radicals and were not entirely accepted by the colonists 
before 1764, suddenly became widely welcomed, first by the poor and soon by the merchants 
and wealthier residents. The willingness of the public to gradually reject the old ideas and 
replace them with new was a remarkable accomplishment. Everyone knows from their personal 
experience how hard it is to change your personality or your beliefs in a short time. However, 
that was not the case here. The change in American minds started a long time before rumors 
about the British intention to tax colonies began. In some way, it was the unintended 
consequence of British Americas migrants’ desires and aspirations for a better life.  
 
 Long before the Anglo-American controversy, North American colonies saw themselves 
as quasi-independent states. They had their own legislatures, town assemblies, and residents as 
their representatives. Despite that, they still considered themselves as active inhabitants of the 
British Empire and loyal to the Crown. The only thing they were reluctant to accept was the 
arbitrary control of the British government. It was a common belief that the governmental body 
had to mirror society and promote people’s desires. The government in London implicitly 
endorsed that view by loosely enforcing the regulations and laws in America that applied 
somewhere else. With the same zeal the colonials believed, as same as Samuel Williams did in 
1774, that in the environment in which “the greatest part of the nations of the earth, are [were] 
held together under the yoke of universal slavery, the North-American provinces yet remain[ed] 
the country of free men: The asylum, and the last, to which such may flee from the common 
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deluge.”24 The religious dissidents looking for their “shining city upon the hill,” families hoping 
for a better life, found their peace in this vast territory.  
 
 In many other aspects, the communities radically differentiate from each other. For 
instance, Pennsylvania was a propriety colony under the leadership of the Penn family, but also 
was the hub of Quakerism. On the other hand, Maryland was mostly Catholic and started under 
the rule of the proprietors first, but then, same as New Jersey and North and South Carolina, 
became a royal, “and then straddled into two forms, with the Crown naming the chief officials 
but proprietors retaining the title too much of the land.”25The difference was not only evident in 
the conventional distinction of the type of colonies, but also on the grounds of customs and, 
especially, religion.  
 
 Some communities, mainly populating the Middle colonies, despised Yankees, who were 
mostly Congregationalists and Presbyterians, 26and terrorized religious dissenters amongst their 
own people. Bostonians celebrated the “Pope’s Day” on November 5th, a derogatory holiday 
brought from England (an American version of England’s Guy Fawkes Day), to commemorate 
the Gunpowder Plot of 1605, while others, mainly Catholic, despised that tradition. Many 
communities placed legislations on the statutory books denying followers of particular religions 
right to naturalize or hold the public office, while others were divided into dogmatic questions, 
such as Quakers communities in Pennsylvania in 1755. It is impossible to defend the argument of 
this research without talking about one of the main characteristics of the colonies that would 
continuously be present during the Anglo-American controversy and post-conflict years, the 
question of religious toleration, or rather discrimination, interconnected with nativism and 
power. 
 
Religion in British America 
 
 Not only did the colonists accepted the extended definition of heresy, which they did not 
like while they were oppressed by the European powers, but they also engaged in the witch hunt 
of dissenters. They went from being oppressed to an oppressor. Many non-Puritan groups 
experienced ambiguous, odd, and very violent policies in the New World. According to Consider 
Tiffany, “the Independents Churches in New England would not tolerate any Religious sects, but 
only their own; they not only persecuted the Quakers but all other denominations Even Down To 
A.D. 1774. And not long after the Quaker persecution, They fell upon The scheme of hanging all 
other Sects, But only Their own, by accusing Them of witch craft, and many persons Suffered 
Thereby in Salem and other Towns. Some persons were tortured, in order they might Confess 
Their Guilt; others were forced To Climb Trees, and if The falling of The Tree Did not Kill 
Them, Then That was Sufficient proof That They were witches or wizards, and They were 
accordingly Executed.” 27 
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 The Roman Catholic faith became a synonym for a “devil” and “witch” in British 
America. In Discoveries of Witchcraft, Leonard Scot said that the “witches are women which be 
commonly old, lame, bleare-eied, pale, fowle, and full of wrinkles; poore, sullen, superstitious, 
and Papists; or such as know no religion.”28 Similarly, Rev. Josiah Templie, in his sermon 
preached at Rye in 1619, argued that “because of witchcraft we have divers mischiefs and 
disorders; and witches they be so long as there be Papists, drabs of the strumpet Pope.”29 Cotton 
Mather echoed the latter words during Ann Glover’s which trial and the Salem Trials that 
followed it. Catholics were the antithesis to the dominant religion and the origin of many 
problems that existed within the community. Their beliefs would be tested but would never get a 
passing grade from the oppressors because their “foreignness” would be noticeable.  
 
 After Glover was found guilty, Cotton Mather visited her in the prison and asked her to 
recite the Lord’s Prayer. It was a common belief that a Catholic nor Witch would be able to say 
that prayer. However, Ann Glover said Pater Noster in Latin, Irish, and English, but, according 
to Mather, she “could not end it.”30 Mather’s observation was incorrect. Glover was able to finish 
it, but not in the way Mather wanted it. He wanted the Protestant version. By using prayer as a 
tool of checking someone’s innocence but, at the same time, not recognizing the existence of 
different religions, Cotton Mather proved that, as Kenneth C. Davis argues, “their ‘city upon a 
hill’ was theocracy that brooked no dissent, religious or political.”31The discriminatory policies 
cannot be justified as fear of the Pope or new residents; instead, it was a fear of dissent and 
losing dominance.32  
 
 Another group of non-Puritan who experienced similar religious discrimination were the 
Religious Society of Friends, also known as Quakers. They would be persecuted because of their 
weirdness and views, including a belief that God is present in every person. For example, the 
Massachusetts General Court passed the act that proscribed a death penalty for the followers of 
Quakerism who resided in that colony. In 1659, two Quakers, William Robinson, and 
Marmaduke Stevenson were executed in the letter colony because of just being the Friends.  
 
 A week before his execution, Stevenson in his emotional testimony described the 
Massachusetts law and declared to the oppressors that he would rather die for his beliefs than 
give up his religion: “So, after some time that I had been on the said island in the service of God, 
I heard that New England had made a law to put the servants of the living God to death if they 
returned after they were sentenced away, which did come near me at that time; and, as I 
considered the thing and pondered it in my heart, immediately came to word of the Lord unto 
me, saying, ‘Thou knowest not but that thou mayst go thither.’”33 
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 Even though the most colonies had the similar laws on their books as two Quakers or 
Glover experienced or had tried to disobey parliamentary policies regarding naturalization or 
religion at least once, there were some communities that did not behave in that way. The Lopez-
Elizur incident is an excellent example of the latter. 
 
 Two Newport merchants, Aaron Lopez, and Isaac Elizur applied for the naturalization at 
the Rhode Island Superior Court on March 1761. They cited the legislative act of 1740 that 
allowed “the admission of Jews to the rights of subjectship.”34 The court denied their petition on 
the “grounds that the Naturalization Act of 1740 referred to in the petition was not in the Court 
of and that only the General Assembly could act upon this petition as it had in other cases.”35 
The legislature scheduled a vote on the petitions and the lower house voted in favor of it, but the 
upper house refused to do the same. Lopez and Elizur went back to the Superior Court, and they 
applied again. This time the Court did not deny the jurisdiction over the case, but it upheld the 
legislature’s ruling. The court (not convincingly) argued that “since the Rhode Island was 
‘already so full of people that many of His Majesty’s good subjects born within the same have 
removed and settled in Nova Scotia, and other places, [the colony] cannot come within the 
intention of the said act.’”36 They also said that naturalization of Jews “as fellow subjects was 
‘wholly inconsistent with the first principles upon which the colony was formed.”37 In the end, 
both of them were able to naturalize, not in Rhode Island though, but in other colonies, and both 
returned to their home colonies as subjects.  
 
 During the Anglo-American conflict, the patriots would be claiming, as Bernard Bailyn 
argues, “liberty of conscience to be an ‘unalienable right of every rational creature,” but, as we 
have seen, that was not a case prior to the controversy.38 Although, without colonists who rather 
spent time behind the bars, tried to trick the system or gave up their property instead of 
capitulating to the established religion or paying a tax that would go to the religious organization 
they weren’t members of or did not support it, the question of relationship between church and 
state would never emerge during the conflict and would never be settled during the debate for the 
second constitution of the United States. Now, after we spent some time describing political, 
social, and religious characteristics of the colonial America, it is time to start with the 
revolutionary narrative.  
 
The Beginning of the Radical Change of the British America’ Residents  
 
 Following the Treaty of Paris and the conclusion of the French and Indian War, the 
mother country had a huge surprise for their subjects claiming domicile in British America. 
George Grenville, the British prime minister, believed it was time to ask, rather demand, the 
colonials to start financially supporting the crown. The empire was close to the declaring the 
bankruptcy, and costs of America’s administration and defense were immense. Grenville knew 
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that British hegemony could only last as long as they were able to control newly acquired 
territories, but the problem was how to support it financially. He also believed that, at little cost, 
the colonials profited more than any other British subject from the war. In his view, the colonial 
trade and economy could only continue to grow, and, one day, become a threat to the British 
interest, except if it was regulated. 
 
 On the other hand, Grenville and the company in the Parliament, whose top priority was 
always to protect their personal interest over the country’s, saw the opportunity to enact “great 
and necessary measures” that would secure “Britain’s primacy in the face of what was starting to 
look like danger from the colonies.”39 They wanted to destroy illegal trade, which negatively 
affected their businesses or ones owned by the wealthy residents of the British Isles, and pass 
stronger measures that would make it impossible for the colonials to halt enforcement of 
parliamentary acts. Some of them also complained about the American judicial system and the 
inability of the crown’s prosecutors to convince the jury to convict the smugglers. As one 
prominent historian described, “the costs of war, the looseness of empire, the certainty that the 
parliament was a right institution to legislate a remedy” formed the grounds of the Grenville’s 
decision to change the way the colonies were run.40 With the King’s blessing, the Prime Minister 
started working on the package of acts.  
 
 In 1764, Grenville proposed the passage of the Revenue Act, better known as the “Sugar 
Act.” The purpose of the act was to stop smuggling, which negatively affected the British trade 
and imperial system, and had ended the inefficient navigation system. The statute upheld and 
extended previous actions regarding “the clandestine landing of goods in this kingdom from 
vessels which hover upon the coasts thereof, several goods and vessels.” The bill announced that 
“from and after the twenty-ninth day of September, one thousand seven hundred and sixty-four,” 
that all goods not reported to the custom officials, but concealed in some hidden compartment on 
the ship shall be forfeited and lost, and shall and may be seized and prosecuted by any officer of 
the customs.” If the colonial juries would not convict smugglers, the act authorized the court of 
vice-admiralty to hear the case. The sole judge, who was appointed to listen to arguments 
regarding technicality of the maritime law, would decide the dispute and determine a 
punishment. In order to make sure that the act was enforced, Grenville decided to provide 
custom officials with their share of booty: “one third part of the net produce shall be paid into the 
hands of the collector of his Majesty’s customs at the port or place where such penalties or 
forfeitures shall be recovered, for the use of his Majesty, his heirs and successors; one third part 
to the governor or commander in chief of the said colony or plantation; and the other third part to 
the person who shall seize, inform, and sue for the same; excepting such seizures as shall be 
made at sea by the commanders or officers of his Majesty’s ships or vessels of war duly 
authorized to make seizures.”41 It was a lucrative inducement.  
 
 The Act also tried to protect the British interests and secure market for the British 
farmers. Even though the Molasses Act of 1733 had already imposed duties on the foreign 
molasses and proscribed regulations for the aforesaid trade, it was barely enforced. To ensure the 
workability of the new law, Grenville created a massive bureaucracy. Every vessel would be 
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required to declare its cargo and submit an affidavit of origin of the products, “signed and sword 
to before some justice of the peace in the said British colonies or plantation to the customs 
officials,” to the customs official who would issue a certificate. Upon the arrival to the port of 
“her discharge, either in Great Britain or any other port of his Majesty’s dominions, where such 
goods may be lawfully imported, the master or other person taking the charge of the ship or 
vessel shall, at the time he makes his report of his cargo, deliver the said certificate to the 
collector or other principal officer of the customs.” And, if some hidden and undeclared cargo 
was found aboard, the customs officials would fortify it. Finally, the act lowered a duty imposed 
on “molasses or syrups, being the growth, product, or manufacture, of any colony or plantation 
in America, not under the dominion of his Majesty,” to three pence. Grenville, as same as his 
successors, would continue to believe that the cheaper products would discourage smuggling, but 
whether he was right, the upcoming events would show it.   
 
 Grenville was aware that the Sugar Act would not be able to solve the “colonial 
problems” on its own. He needed a measure that would not be noticeable in the colonial ports, 
but one that would “reach into the heart of the American economy.”42  Therefore, in 1765, 
Grenville sent the “An act for granting and applying certain stamp duties,” popularly known as 
the “Stamp Act,” to the Parliament. The act required the purchase of the stamps for every piece 
of paper, which was nothing new, but the scope could not compare with the previous laws.43 All 
official documents, court documents, marriage certificates, “every paper, commonly called a 
pamphlet, and upon every news paper, containing publick news, intelligence, or occurrences,” 
playing cards, dice and many other things fall were required to be stamped under the aforesaid 
act.44 
 Moreover, the law required all purchases to be made in sterling, which was an intentional 
attack to local currencies or any attempt of it, and would continuously be evident in the 
communities and would impact all social classes.45 As Edward Countrymen noted, “the rich, the 
poor, producers, consumers, the powerful, the powerless, people of commerce, people of fields, 
old people making their wills, young people planning to marry, pious people going to church, 
ribald people going to tavern, all of them would feel it.”46 Finally, under the act, only vendors 
authorized by the government, who were very often siblings of the royal officials, were able to 
sell the stamps. Similarly, to the Sugar Act, the court of vice-admiralty would have jurisdiction 
over the cases involving stamps and hefty booty would be given to the stamp masters and “to the 
person who shall inform or sue for the same.”47  
 
 Even though Grenville probably never thought his actions would start the revolution nor 
induce the colonies to declare the independence, it is surprising that he and other politicians 
believed that the colonies would quickly replace the loose system with more centralized and give 
up the privileges they enjoyed. However, when George Grenville introduced notorious Sugar 
Act, and, especially, Stamp Act, it was apparent that London was planning to start to mingle into 
the internal affairs of the colonies after years of inaction. Still loyal to the crown, the colonists' 
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tried to make a case against the sovereignty of the parliament and to differentiate between 
external and internal rights and taxation. Even though they did not like the Sugar Act at all and 
had protested against it in the several pamphlets and issued a couple of statements, the act was 
quickly enacted and stayed on the books until the war started. The unethical and discriminatory 
Stamp Act became a focus of their grievances.  
 
 The Stamp Act was justifiably a trap, like a Trojan horse. The revenue collected from the 
aforesaid act would be quite small, and most residents would readily submit to it, which certainly 
was the case with some moderate colonials. However, the bill would establish a precedent and 
could be accordingly used thereafter. As John Dickerson argued at the height of the Anglo-
American controversy, “nothing was wanted at home but a PRECEDENT, the force of which 
shall be established by the tacit submission of the colonies…If the Parliament succeeds in this 
attempt, other statutes will impose other duties…and thus the Parliament will levy upon us such 
sums of money as they choose to take, without any other LIMITATION than their 
PLEASURE.”48 To the colonials, it was clear that the corruption, which destroyed Denmark and 
Poland, was coming to America.  
 
 In 1765, the group, the Sons of Liberty, led by Samuel Adams, known as "the Lenin of 
the American Revolution," rallied masses to protest the actions and to demand repeal of the 
Stamp Act.49 They paraded on the streets of Boston, met under the Liberty Tree, and held British 
profiteers, custom, and government officials in the contempt. Riots were getting bigger and more 
violent every day. The anger could be felt in almost in every community.  
 
 The protestors marched to the government officials’ mansions, banged on the door and 
demanded either public resignation or promise not to endorse the Act. They even went one, or 
even more than one, step further. On Wednesday, August 14, 1765, Bostonians rushed to see 
effigy of Andrew Oliver, who was newly appointed stamp master and Thomas Hutchinson’s 
brother in law, and a boot with devil with a copy of the Stamp Act, which was a symbol for Lord 
Bute whom the colonials blamed for exercising influence over young King, hanging from the 
tree.50 Onto Oliver’s effigy was pinned a couplet: “What greater joy did New England see/ Than 
a stamp man hanging on a tree,” and beneath the figure was posted a warning: “He that takes this 
down is an enemy to his country.” 51 The described violence was not peculiar to only Boston. On 
August 27, effigies of stamp masters were placed in Newport and officials were harassed. In 
Annapolis, the protestors burned down the warehouse where the stamps were stored. The 
episodes of the vandalism and stamp officials’ resignations continued throughout British 
America. Even though protestors were reluctant to use civil unrest to achieve desirable outcome 
initially, they realized it was “an effective way to intimidate local British officials.”52  
 
 Samuel Adams and prominent members of the Sons of Liberty knew about rioters’ tools 
and secretly supported them, but they publicly denied any knowledge of violent actions; instead, 
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they focused on writing newspaper articles, circular letters to other colonies, or pamphlets. 53 
They left the streets to the ordinary citizens, who not only resented the Stamp Act but the 
“accumulation of wealth and power by the haughty prerogative faction led by Hutchinson” and 
other profiteers.54 As Garry B. Nash argues, “Behind every swing of the ax and every hurled 
stone, behind every shattered crystal goblet and splintered mahogany chair, lay the furry of a 
plain Bostonian who had read or heard the repeated references to impoverished people as 
‘rabble’ and to Boston’s popular caucus, led by Samuel Adams, as a ‘herd of fools, tools, and 
sycophants.’”55 
 
 Even if London was not convinced right away, the dismantling of Oliver’s and 
Hutchinson’s homes and Governor Bernard’s inability to disperse the protestors was a sufficient 
proof of unworkability of the administration and failure to consolidate control over the colonies. 
The colonial government was paralyzed. “The Mob was so general and so supported that all civil 
power ceased in an instant, and I had not the least authority to oppose or quiet the mob,” wrote 
Governor Bernard.56 London was helpless, as well. Usage of military force was undesirable and 
unlikely; negotiating with the demonstrators and submitting to their demands was seen as 
dishonorable. They instructed royal governors to adjourn town halls, secure stamps, and try to 
obstruct the planned meeting of colonies, the Stamp Act Congress, in New York regarding 
colonial response to the act by preventing the election of the delegates. Governors of Virginia, 
North Carolina, and Georgia succeeded, and others did not. However, after months of 
stubbornness and being harassed by the colonists, the British government finally gave up and 
decided to repeal the Act. Officially, the law was revoked in March of 1766, but the story was far 
from being over. The political climate in the Westminster before and after the repeal showed it.  
 
The Westminster and government’s second chance 
 
 The Parliamentary debate on the Stamp Act and colonies was very intense. It showed 
division within the House of Commons, and political inability to cope with the colonial response 
and crown’s desires. George Grenville and Townsend argued fiercely for keeping the Stamp Act 
on the books but would accept some adjustments to the law. Others called for the repeal of the 
act. The discourse culminated when William Pitt made a sudden appearance on the House Floor 
and attacked Grenville’s policy. The speech he delivered was eagerly welcomed across the pond 
and gave the credibility to the American argument.  
 
 He opened his remarks with his J’Accuse moment. “I have been charged,” he stated in 
the opening paragraph, “with giving birth to sedition in America. They have spoken their 
sentiments with freedom against this unhappy act, and that freedom has become their crime.” 
“The gentleman asks,” he continued, “when were the colonies emancipated? But I desire to 
know, when were they made slaves.” Then, he assured them their “success would be hazardous. 
America, if she fell, would fall like a strong man. She would embrace the pillars of the state and 
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pull down the constitution along with her.”57 Even though Pitt was calling for the immediate 
repeal of the Stamp Act and dismissed MP’s “crying injustice” as groundless, he firmly believed 
that the Parliament ought to have control over its colonies. However, he thought that the 
Parliament did not have a right to impose duties on the colonies without their consent. He 
explained that “the taxation is no part of the governing or the legislative power. The taxes are a 
voluntary gift and grant of the commons alone.” Only provincial assemblies possessed a 
constitutional authority to tax their citizens. If they did not have that right, they would be slaves. 
“But in American tax,” he asked “what do we do? We, your majesty’s commons of Great 
Britain, give and grant to your majesty, what” Our own property? No. We give and grant to your 
majesty, the property of your commons in America. It is an absurdity in terms.” He concluded 
that as long as the Americans did not have their representatives seating in the House of 
Commons, the internal tax would be unjust. The Parliament listened to Pitt’s words and voted to 
repeal the act. They also passed the Declaratory Act, a resolution that proclaimed the Parliament 
had “full power and authority to make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind 
the colonies and people of America, subjects of the crown of Great Britain, in all cases 
whatsoever.”58 The law was ambiguous, and it signaled the continuation of the conflict. 
 
 What did the debate on the House floor and the Parliament’s post-repeal resolution show 
was that the British imperial and parliamentary honor were vulnerable, embarrassed, and 
undermined by the British American colonies. In its long history, the Westminster had never 
experienced to be successfully harassed by the inferior subject and lectured by its member on 
their authority. In the aftermath of the repeal, the parliament was lost, and MP’s were panicking 
about their reputation. What would the British foreign and domestic adversaries think? What 
about the economy and British colonial interests? Was this a sign that the British Empire was 
falling apart? Was the government broken and ineffective? Probably questions like that induced 
many MPs that it is time to do something. The Sons of England had to learn their lesson. Two-
years after the repeal of the act, they decided to give one more try and introduce another tax bill. 
This time, however, members of the parliament thought, and were assured, they would succeed 
in their attempt. They would simply follow colonial desires. What can possibly go wrong? 
 
 During the debate for the repeal of the Stamp Act, the House of Commons invited 
Benjamin Franklin, a Pennsylvania agent, to testify before them. They wanted to learn about the 
colonial political mood.59Franklin accepted, as A.J. Langguth describes, because he “hoped to 
soothe those members who felt that the Sons of Liberty must be taught the lesson.” However, 
Franklin’s admission that the “authority of parliament was allowed to be valid in all laws, except 
such as should lay internal taxes” was quintessential. When asked to elaborate on his answer, he 
stated that he “never heard any objection to the right of laying duties to regulate commerce; but a 
right to lay internal taxes was never supposed to be in parliament, as we [the colonials] are not 
represented there.”60 Based on Franklin’s testimony and the colonial submission to the Sugar 
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Act, Charles Townshend decided to reintroduce the idea of an American tax and hoped to portray 
himself as a tough leader. The bill won the support in the Parliament, despite Pitt’s objection, 
and was scheduled to take effect on November 20th, 1767. However, the Parliament passed 
additional four acts in the term 1767 and 1768 regarding colonial politics, and together with this 
bill, they were part of the Townshend reforms.  
The new tax would be collected for goods “imported from Great Britain into any colony 
or plantation in America at the port of entry. It would be imposed on “the several commodities 
that Americans were required by law to import exclusively from England—paint, paper, lead, 
and tea.”61 He also lucratively lowered tax on the East Indian Company Tea with the hope of 
destroying the illicit trade. Moreover, Townshend provided customs officials with broad powers. 
It was easier to obtain the writs of assistance, and “to enter and go into any house, warehouse, 
shop, cellar, or other place, in the British colonies of plantations of America, to search for and 
seize prohibited or uncustomed goods.”62 The Commissioners of Customs Act replaced the 
“commissioners of the customs in England” under whose authority the customs officials in 
America operated with the commissioners who were in the colonies. Townshend appointed five 
new commissioners, headquartered in Boston, “who would have the same powers and authorities 
for carrying into execution the several laws relating to the revenues and trade of the said British 
colonies in Americas.”63 To avoid colonial juries that usually were unwilling to prosecute 
smugglers and other colonials, Townshend continued the tradition of the usage of the Court of 
Admiralty. The universal right, the trial by the peers, that every British subject was proud of and 
enjoyed it was suddenly diminished. It is surprising that Townshend and his supporters thought 
they would succeed in their attempt. 
 
The collapse of British parliamentary honor: “Then join hand in hand, brave Americans 
all.” 
 
 The colonials responded with the fire and fury to the Townshend Acts. Pamphlets, 
sermons, poems, and songs were written in the protest. People were back on the streets. They 
were parading, yelling, and demanding answers:  
“In FREEDOM we’re BORN, and in FREEDOM we’ll LIVE  
Our Purses are ready,       
Steady, Friends, Steady,       
Not as SLAVES, but as FREEMEN our Money we’ll give”64 
 
 “If Great Britain,” the Pennsylvania farmer, John Dickinson told his countrymen, “can order us 
to come to her for necessaries we want, and can order us to pay what taxes she pleases before we 
take them away, or when we land them here, we are as abject slaves as France and Poland can 
show in wooden shoes and with uncombed hair. . . .”65 With the same zeal, Hannah Griffitts 
proclaimed: 
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“If the Sons, so degenerate! the Blessing despise, Let the Daughters of Liberty nobly arise.”66 
 
People were galvanized, and nothing could have stopped them. The leader of the Sons of Liberty, 
Samuel Adams, wanted to use that anger and seize the five commissioners on their arrival and 
march them to the Liberty Tree where they would be forced to resign. Even though Adams’s 
proposal did not win the support, the mob eventually turned their anger onto the customs 
officials.  
The customs decision to seize John Hancock’s ship Liberty for the false tax declaration 
and the presence of H.M.S. Romney in the harbor inflamed the Bostonians. They saw it as a 
provocation. The mob was throwing stones on the customs officials and beating them with the 
clubs. Collector Joseph Harrison was beaten, and his son was dragged through the streets of 
Boston by his hair.67 After trying to take control over the crowd, the commissioners capitulated 
and took a refugee on the Romney. Soon, they escaped to the safer place, the Castle William. 
Violence continued even though the commissioners were lodged in the unassailable quarters. 
Meanwhile, Samuel Adams and James Otis, during the session of the Massachusetts 
House, tried to persuade their colleagues to authorize the circular letter to other colonies against 
the Townshend Acts, but they were couple of votes short. But when the Bernard’s and 
Hutchinson’s supporters left the town, Adams and Otis got the majority. The circular letter was 
sent to the colonial brothers.  
In the letter, Adams surprisingly acknowledged that “his Majesty’s high court of 
Parliament is [was] the supreme legislative power over the whole empire,” but, if the sole 
purpose was to raise the money, the external duties were infringements on the constitutional and 
natural rights.68 The taxation without representation could not be supported. They also eagerly 
attacked Townshend’s attempt to destroy the only leverage the colonies had, providing money 
for the salaries of the royal officials. “The judges of the land and other civil officers,” Adams 
asserted, “having salaries appointed for them by the Crown, independent of the people,” were 
contradictory to the law of nature. 69However, the Crown did not understand the meaning of the 
letter again. 
Even though the letter was not as radical as it could have been, the British Secretary for 
Colonial Affairs, condemned it. “As his Majesty,” the Earl of Hillsborough began, “considers 
this Measure [the circular letter] to be of a most dangerous & factious tendency calculated to 
enflame the minds of his good Subjects in the Colonies, to promote an unwarrantable 
combination and to excite and encourage an open opposition to and denial of the Authority of 
Parliament, &to subvert the true principles of the constitution.”70 He instructed colonial officials 
“to prevent any proceeding upon it by an immediate Prorogation or Dissolution” of the 
assemblies if the letter “give [gave] any Countenance to this Seditious Paper.”71 The decision to 
disrupt and undermine the legitimacy of the provincial assemblies was another proof of 
London’s corruption. The colonies did not have other option than to continue with the 
demonstrations. They signed the non-importation agreement and pledged not to import nor use 
commodities taxed under the Townshend Acts. Even though some pro-British residents, notably 
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Peter Oliver, accused Patriots of hypocrisy, residents generally followed the agreement and 
called out those who had not. What the colonials did privately, they did not share with others. If 
somebody had confronted them about the commodities, they would certainly deny the 
possession. However, the smugglers did not close their businesses.   
Meanwhile, during the summer of 1768, Governor Francis Bernard admitted that the 
royal government lost control over Boston. “So we are not without a Government, only it is in 
the hands of the people of the Town,” he described the situation. The Town meetings 
illegitimately took over the control over their communities, a power that naturally belonged to 
the royal government. It was a sign of the state of war. The crown decided to send three 
regiments of troops to Boston under the command of General Gage to establish order and secure 
the community from the future unrests. The arrival and presence of the soldiers just rubbed the 
salt into the fresh colonial wound. 
 
 Gage was demanding that the troops were quartered in Boston and, none and less, in the 
private homes. The bitter memory of the suffrage, a refusal to comply with the Quartering Act of 
1765, of fellow compatriots in New York was suddenly revived. The new British action was seen 
as yet another proof of “taxation without a representation,” and the propaganda machine got the 
opportunity they had been waiting for. The British patience was almost exhausted when the 
HMS Liberty was destroyed by the protestors in Newport. The incident showed “the degree to 
which the colonial leaders were willing to go to demonstrate their control of the local 
environment.”72 The culmination of the conflict, however, was yet to come.  
When on February 22, 1770, notable loyalist Ebenezer Richardson visited a merchant 
who was a target of the protestors and attempted to destroy the sign condemning a merchant, the 
demonstrators confronted him and harassed him on his way home.73 They were throwing rocks 
and wood at him, and ultimately onto his house. Feeling endangered, he took his musket and 
threatened to use it. The crowd was unmoved with his words and continued with the riot. 
Ultimately, he pulled the trigger and wounded several people, including an eleven-year-old boy, 
Christopher Seider, who died that evening. The Sons of Liberty organized a massive funeral, 
portrayed him as a martyr, and used his death for further confrontation with the British. 
However, the significance of this event was far more significant. It was an overture into one of 
the bloodiest incidents of the pre-war struggle, the Boston Massacre. 
On March 2, 1770, an off-duty soldier, Patrick Walker, of the twenty-ninth regiment was 
looking for a part-time job in addition to his military assignment. The soldier’s endeavor was not 
unusual. The British soldiers usually wanted to pick up extra money during their free time. 
Walker went to Boston’s largest rope maker at the time, John Gray, who employed soldiers for a 
temporary job, but was insulted by one of Grey’s employees. In that spirit, William Green told 
Walker to “go and clean out my shithouse” in response to walker’s request for a job.74 Walker 
was furious and attacked Green and other employees but was knocked down. He rushed to 
barracks pledging to be avenged and was back with fellow soldiers demanding answers. The 
similar encounters with the twenty-ninth regiment would continue in the days that followed.75  
On March 5, Walker’s regiment took responsibility for the sentry posts in Boston and 
became a target of protestors. One young Bostonian harassed a soldier stationed near the customs 
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house and was eventually struck with the musket. The crowd gathered around the sentry and 
continued with insults. The riot spread throughout the town. The church bells started to ring, and 
people were shouting “fire.” The reinforcements were sent to the customhouse under Capt. 
Thomas Preston’s command to free the sentry and march back to the barracks.  
The people formed a human shield and with the same zeal insulted the troops. The loud 
shouts could only be heard. The soldiers were hit with the snowballs from all sides and were 
helplessly standing there in the formation with loaded muskets. Then, one soldier was knocked 
down and fired into the crowd. The others followed. The first victim was an African American 
boy, Crispus Atticus.   
No one heard that the Preston ordered his troops to fire nor to cease it. The calls to 
“arms” and beating of the drums could be heard, but Sons of Liberty were calling for the 
cessation of the hostility. Samuel Adams knew the significance of the event. He soon called the 
courts to prosecute the soldiers and organized a massive funeral for the victims. The propaganda 
machine was working tirelessly but was not able to secure justice. Capt. Preston was not 
convicted, and some soldiers got away from the punishment by pleading a benefit of clergy. 
Once again, the outrage came back to the streets, and the dispute continued into another 
decade.76 
 
The 1770s: A Birth of the Colonial Transformation  
 
 The acceleration of violence affected the Parliament’s patience and the British economy. 
The Townshend Acts had shown to be unworkable and fatal. Ultimately, the Parliament decided 
to repeal almost all of the acts, except the most hated act, the Tea Act. “The result was,” as 
Countrymen argues, “that once again, Parliament’s pride and the problem of colonial revenue 
became intertwined.”77 One thing the Westminster knew for sure was that the parliamentary 
tradition and honor could not be undermined by the inferior British subjects. As Countrymen 
further described. “It was important to assert the principle that Parliament could do what it 
wanted when it wanted, to whom it wanted.”78 With troops in Boston and elevation of Lt. 
Governor Thomas Hutchinson to the governorship, the Parliament’s stubbornness and ignorance 
were not prudent. Some would think that they would realize that by then, but the actions that 
followed serve as proof that London did not learn anything from the past mistakes.  
The smugglers provided the colonies with a cheaper Dutch tea, and the Townshend and 
non-importation agreement decreased the East India Company’s sales in America, which became 
a problem.  As Edward Countrymen describes, “like the chartered companies that began 
American colonization, the East India Company tried to carry out both the private function of 
making a profit and the public task of governing a society.”79 More Tea in the warehouses, less 
profit, and influence.  
In 1733, the company was on the brink of collapse, and the Parliament could not risk 
losing a pro-British force in the strategic part of the world. Instead of restructuring the East India 
company and providing the loan, the Parliament decided to allow them to have tea monopoly in 
the colonies, an exclusive right to sell the tea. 
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 Now, the Company would have its own colonial agents. It would not have to go through 
a bidding process in Britain nor pay the importation duty twice. The three pence Townshend duty 
would only be required to be paid. Ultimately, the tea would be cheaper than the smuggled Dutch 
or legal one sold by the Americans.  The Westminster was rubbing its hands. Only foolish people 
would protest more affordable commodities. Britain would finally teach the colonies its lesson, 
would raise the much-needed revenue and save the crucial company.  But on December 16, 
1773, the Sons of Liberty, dressed as Indians to symbolize American freedom and to hide their 
true identities, climbed onto the decks of three ships, Dartmouth, Eleanor, and Beaver, and 
dumped the tea, which was on the vessel, into the Boston harbor. “What a cup of tea,” said one 
of the participants, “we’re making for the fishes.”80 What a cup of tea they made for the 
Parliament. The British were confused and paralyzed. Any attempt to respond would result in the 
destruction of ships and its cargo. Governor Hutchinson deemed it necessary to use the military 
force to end the riots for once and for all.  
The Parliament agreed that the time of wimpy laws and officials was over. As a response 
to the Boston Tea Party and other similar incidents in other colonies, notably in New York City, 
the Parliament passed the four acts, commonly known as the Coercive Acts of 1774. Under the 
law, the Port of Boston was closed for the commercial shipping, except supplies necessary to 
feed the population; the autonomy of local assemblies was limited, and committee of 
correspondence was banned; governor gained a right to appoint officers, who were usually 
annually elected, and to move trials to other colonies or Britain, if he deemed it necessary; 
finally, the Quartering Act of 1765 was expanded, and the governor could seize “such and so 
many uninhabited houses, out-houses, barns, or other buildings, as he shall think necessary to be 
taken… for such time as he shall think proper.”81 American colonials, suddenly, lost all rights 
known to the British subjects elsewhere. Also, to their surprise, the Westminster extended rights 
to the French Catholics in the province of Quebec.  
To enforce the parliament’s will, the crown replaced Thomas Hutchinson with General 
Gage. As soon as the news of new laws reached the harbor, Gage announced the arrival of four 
regiments and closure of the Massachusetts legislature until June.  The martial law was born. The 
colonials were outraged and disappointed. They did not have other choices than to call for 
colonial congress. 
 Colonies, towns, cities, and villages all welcomed the invitation and started organizing 
the convention of colonies in Philadelphia. The communities forgot their differences and were 
united in the same cause, and when they finally met, they began to work on the specific action 
plan. However, Britain continued to ignore the colonial grievances and use military strength to 
subordinate their subjects. The conflict had become a zero-sum game, and it was becoming 
evident that the military conflict was on the horizon. Meanwhile, the first America’s intelligence 
organization, Mechanics, composed of members of the Sons of Liberty, was formed.  
The creation of clandestine groups attests the seriousness of the situation. When the 
movement can entrust its secrets to the members and embark them onto classified missions, it 
shows matureness of their vision.82 Samuel Adams knew that the existence of the cause 
depended upon accurate identification of the British intentions and clear initiatives, and that 
could only have been achieved through the intelligence collection. Without the committed 
agents, the colonials would not be able to monitor British troop movements, ammunition, and 
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assassination plots, such as one planned by the British soldiers for the fifth anniversary of the 
Boston Massacre. On the other hand, Thomas Gage, without his intelligence capabilities, would 
be ignorant of the Sons of Liberty’s actions.  
The British administration continued to collapse. Without taxes, the control over 
communities was impossible.83 The committee of correspondence and local politicians were 
gradually taking control, and, to protect their authority, colonials started to organize local 
militias.84  After witnessing the mobilization, John Murray, the royal governor of Virginia, 
reported to London in 1774 that “every county was ‘arming a company of men for the avowed 
purpose of protecting their committees.’”85 He also stated that “there is not a justice of the peace 
in Virginia that acts except as a committee man.”86 The British were stunt. The “prepping of the 
battlefield” had just begun and would grow into the hot conflict on April 19, 1775. With Concord 
and Lexington under attack, Bostonians and other colonies knew that it was time to take up arms 
and fight the British. It was no longer a struggle of radicals; instead, it was a battle for the 
existence of their natural rights, specifically under the British constitution. The Americans 
resented beginning any serious discussion about the country’s independence until it was the only 
option left.  
Between 1765 and 1775, the Americans did not march on the streets because they wanted 
to cut their ties with the mother country; instead, they wanted to raise awareness of the civil 
inequality that existed within the empire. They knew that they were first and foremost British 
subjects and were proud of that. Even though they operated as quasi-independent states and were 
divided on many political and social questions within themselves and with their mother country, 
the European roots were still evident. The English common law and the British Constitution 
were seen as guardians of their liberty. However, London failed to recognize that special 
relationship. The private, corporate, and imperial interests took precedent over anything else. The 
West Indies sugar planters lobbied fiercely in the House of Commons in 1733, and the Molasses 
Act was the result of it.87 The Townshend duties were enacted to cover the cost of lower taxes in 
Britain. And, finally, the Tea Act of 1733 to protect the East India Company. Instead of listening 
to the colonial grievances, the Westminster always thought it was more prudent to show strength 
rather than cooperation. Were the British merely ignorant and stubborn? Was it a conspiracy 
against the colonies, as Americans claimed? The best answer to the questions was offered by 
Edward Countrymen in his book, The American Revolution. 
“It was neither incompetence,” Countrymen begins, “nor simple accident. The men who 
made British policy—Grenville, Townshend, Lord Hillsborough, Lord Shelburne, Lord North, 
King George—were as capable of both wisdom and folly as anyone else.” Instead, it was a 
struggle for power and economic domination. “In the long run,” he continues, “British policy 
would lead to stagnation and underdevelopment for the North American economy, and this was 
no accident.”88 In contrast to the West Indies, the American colonies, especially the northern 
ones, could easily develop an urban economic network. They had already produced almost 
everything necessary on their own, except luxury items and foreign goods, marketed among 
themselves, and exported products, which the metropolis did not want, to other European 
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countries, notably to Southern Europe. It had been evident that the colonies were not as 
dependent as Britain wanted to.   
To secure the British economic might, the Westminster had to remove the competition. 
Economies of two other British territories, Ireland and India, were in the process of the economic 
subordination during that time. “In those countries,” Countrymen describes, “local merchants 
and local trading networks were crushed when the British moved in. Local industry was stifled 
so British industry could prosper. Local agriculture was organized to produce staple crops for 
Britain to process, rather than mixed crops for local people to use.” Now, it was time to do the 
same in America. They would be “foolish to do anything else,” and Americans “would have 
been equally foolish not to resist.”89 
In the end, the birth of the new nation had been slowly and silently in the making. The 
post-Lexington and Concord events were not a result of a sudden outburst of anger, fear, nor 
desires. It was an outcome of, as Bernard Bailyn describes, “the realization, the comprehensions, 
and fulfillment, of the inheritance of liberty and of what was taken to be America’s destiny in the 
context of world history.”90 The British actions, colonial pamphlets, samizdat, and injustice and 
changes within the community induced the colonials to gradually adopt radical ideas. That 
“radical change in the principles, opinions, sentiments, and affections of the people,” as what 
John Adams told Hezekiah Niles91, transformed the society and created an environment that 
could not coexists within the British Empire. Even though many old principles remained present 
in the communities, such as religious and racial discrimination, the new ideas were formulated in 
a way that a prosecuted religious group and a slave could easily subscribe to. Initially, a radical 
idea, suddenly, became conceptualized and accepted by almost everyone on July 4th, 1776. 
 
II. The Birth of mature American Intelligence: The Culper Spy Ring 
 
The final stretch of the conceptualization of American viewpoint started with the Draft of 
Instructions to the Virginia Delegates in the Continental Congress (A Summary View), was 
continued with the publication of Common Sense, and was finished and confirmed with the 
adoption of the Declaration of Independence. All three documents had a tremendous impact on 
colonialists’ personalities and provoked them to realize that the ancien regime was 
unpredictable, unjust, and tyrannical, but any change of the political environment required not 
only adoption of new ideas but also boldness and willingness to fight for a new order. 
 “The sun never,” as Thomas Paine said, “shined on a cause of greater worth.”92 
Colonials all knew that the British actions were contradictory to their promise of not mingling 
into the internal affairs and only securing peace. It was a battle for honor, faith, and life. “The 
whole art of government,” Thomas Jefferson said, “consists in the art of being honest.”93 Life 
was not a life without liberty. That symbiotic relationship was challenged by the King and his 
ministers. “The hand of force” might have weakened the relationship of the two components, 
but, as influential and ordinary colonials detested, had not disjoined them.94 The notion of the 
judiciary superiority over any person or a group promised a revival of human existence. With the 
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words “Life, Liberty, and Pursuit of Happiness,” the new nation, patriotism, and national service 
were born.  
“Had the British Troops,” Consider Tiffany writes, “at the Time of the Lexington fight, 
drove the war, as they could have done at that season; Americans might have been brought to 
thorough subjection to British Constitution of Government.”95 In the immediate aftermath of the 
Lexington and Concord, the British army showed discipline, strength, and maneuver skills. They 
were able to score essential victories and spread fear through the Washington’s camp. The 
unsuccessful initial campaigns together with the expiration of the citizen-soldiers’ commissions 
and scarce provisioning supplies demoralized the American public and the leadership and 
convinced the British that the ultimate defeat of the colonies was on the horizon. From Boston, 
Philadelphia to New York, the Continental Army was always holding the defensive line and was 
constantly on a retreat. However, the American resilience and courage, especially seen during the 
Battle of Bunker Hill in June 1775 and at the Saratoga, and the British inability to assess the real 
strength of the enemy and logistically hard plans undermined the importance of the British 
victories and gave the Patriots ability to recuperate their strength and zeal.  
Although the colonials knew that the victory over such a powerful enemy was impossible 
without accurate and timely information gathering, as Nathan Hale’s situation detests, they did 
not consider it paramount tool on the American battlefield in the early years of the war, 
especially when we take into the consideration that the armed forces had to be created from the 
ordinary residents. In Europe, there was a different picture. The Continental Congress knew that 
the lack of professional clandestine activities had to be compensated with the existence of 
intelligence capabilities on the European continent. On November 29, 1775, Congress created 
the Committee of Secret Correspondence with the task of “corresponding with our friends in 
Great Britain, Ireland and other parts of the world.”96 
The committee had to negotiate alliance and understand the mood of the European states 
sub rosa and see what approach the American leadership had to take to legitimize their cause. “It 
would be agreeable,” the Congress instructed their agent, Arthur Lee, “to Congress to know the 
disposition of foreign powers toward us, and we hope this object will engage your attention. We 
need not hint that great circumspection and impenetrable secrecy are necessary.”97 Paris, a center 
of the first American diplomatic outpost, thus, became, same as Berlin during the Cold War, a 
center of American foreign intelligence gathering under Benjamin Franklin’s leadership. The 
unsustainability of the zero-sum game on the American battlefield and superior British 
counterintelligence possibilities in Europe (the Patriots mainly stayed ignorant of the deep 
penetration of the Paris commission and the tools used by the British) induced George 
Washington to revive the idea of establishment of the professional and somehow superior service 
in the North America. The powerful military enemy could only be defeated with superior 
deception and intelligence master. The intelligence advantage, therefore, was not only prudent 
but inevitable and requisite.  
The military scouting was not enough. George Washington knew that the unique 
American battlefield required a new approach. Residents without a military nor intelligence 
experience would become the cornerstone of the new service. In contrast to disguised soldiers, 
the residents would be able to sneak into the enemy-controlled territory with real passes and 
would not possess a military discipline that very often was a burden for a successful mission.  
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They would enter British lines “under the pretence of asking advice.”98 George Washington 
requested a member of New York’s Committee for Detecting and Defeating Conspiracies, 
William Duer, to recruit someone who would be interested in leading the new clandestine 
service. The name of Nathan Sackett was forwarded to the commander in chief, and the 
nomination was accepted. “The advantage,” Washington wrote to Sackett on February 4th, 1777, 
“of obtaining the earliest and best Intelligence of the design of the enemy, the good character 
given of you by Colonel Duer added to your capacity for an undertaking of this kind have 
induced me to entrust the management of this business to your care till further orders on this 
head.”  He was given $50 a month for his service to the American people and $500 fund “to pay 
those whom you [Sackett] may find necessary to imploy in the transaction of this business.” 
Benjamin Tallmadge, a good friend of Nathan Hale and captain in the Second Continental Light 
Dragoons, was appointed Sackett’s deputy with the task of managing logistics of intelligence 
operations. The first mission was to infiltrate a young Pennsylvania lawyer, Major John Clark, 
into the British Long Island. The Patriots got their first professional agent, case officer, and 
together with the Committee on Spies’ 1776 report to the Congress on how to deal with the 
people, such as Benjamin Church, providing intelligence to the enemy, the American intelligence 
was officially born. Contradictory to the well-established belief, the honorable gentlemen eagerly 
and actively engaged in deceiving the enemy and collecting information on the enemy 
movements and desires.  
Nathan Sackett revolutionized gathering of information. He was sending his agents into 
New York City under various mercantile covers and was using personal situations as a way of 
distilling information from the loyalists and British officers. For instance, he sent a woman who 
was married to the prominent Tory to go to the British authorities regarding the American 
seizure of her personal property.99 Even though Sackett organized the whole intelligence 
community remarkably, he was quickly fired by George Washington. As Daigler says, the 
circumstances under which Sackett was fired remain unknown, but in the letter dated April 8th, 
1777, Washington provided some criticism of the latter’s leadership. The message remains a 
good source of the commander in chief’s view on clandestine service and personality that will be 
evident in the future intelligence and counterintelligence operations.  
“As your Letter of yesterdays date,” Washington begins, “is rather a narrative of what 
you have done, than any thing else, scarce any answer is necessary.” Washington disliked, like 
any other case officer, when his agents engaged in long critical analysis without providing any 
sufficient operational and technical detail. Information had to be specific and accurate and 
reports short and concise. “The good effect of Intelligence,” Washington continued, “may be lost 
if it is not speedily transmitted—this should be strongly Impressed upon the Persons Imployed.” 
Even though the timely delivery of information was justifiable and necessary, it is hard to 
achieve it without logistically complex courier service that increases the possibility of failure of 
the operation, and, thus, it would remain Washington’s main critique of his agents’ activities. 
The poor operational planning and spys’ unprofessionalism would continue to negatively affect 
Washington’s temperament and young and mature, but still immature, intelligence structure.  
Soon after Sackett’s departure, the Continental Army was defeated at the Brandywine 
and lost Philadelphia, a de facto capital city. If he wasn’t already, Washington was fully aware 
that espionage was the only tool left in his toolbox to give a new nation bright future. Both New 
York City and Philadelphia became a focal point of American penetration. John Clark had 
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moved from Long Island to Philadelphia and established an extensive collection network. 
Following Washington’s guidelines, he carefully developed covers, operational and infiltration 
plans. Covers varied from agent to agent, but farmers, tradesmen, or any other profession that 
had access to the city was very often used. Non-Quakers frequently pretended to be the Friends 
and were not subject of searches nor suspicion by the British authorities. Their pacifism was 
widely spread. The frequent travelers and deserters were also used to record new British gossip 
or provide additional information. Finally, Clark was able to successfully deceive General Howe 
by chicken feeding him with the false reports and using at least one double agent. On the other 
hand, Allan McLane, another case officer, focused on a reconnaissance activity, British 
movements, and, as Daigler says, he also probably ran agents in Philadelphia on occasion. Both 
case officers received help from other ordinary dedicated Patriots such as the Darragh family of 
Philadelphia.  
 The intelligence-gathering became a family enterprise, as Daigler says, and each family 
member played an active role. William, the husband, coded intelligence collected by his wife, 
Lydia, and their younger son, John, sewed the message into his clothing and carried it through 
the British controlled territory to his older brother, Charles, who served in the Second 
Pennsylvania Regiment of the Continental Army and passed the decoded information to the 
headquarters.100 Darragh’s military intelligence collection and reporting became a routine. 
However, when on December 2, 1777, Lydia overheard British officers discussing the plan to 
attack quietly American forces at Whitemarsh in her home, she knew that the message had to be 
delivered to the headquarters as soon as possible.101 She embarked on a journey with the disguise 
of going to the nearby mill to purchase flour and went to the American outpost instead. She told 
the commanding officer the message which was promptly forwarded to George Washington 
thereafter. Lydia’s information was cross-referenced with similar reports collected by Clark’s 
agents and confirmed British plans. On Long Island, similarly, residents of one small town 
provided information to the headquarters and were almost principle architects of George 
Washington’s decisions and actions regarding New York, British America, and the whole 
America, especially after the British abandoned Philadelphia. 
  
The Culper Spy Ring  
 
 The occupied New York was a city of intrigues and, as Alexander Rose describes it, 
“intelligence-wise, dark and silent.”102 It was a home of the British North America’s military 
headquarters whose hallways concealed the Crown’s secrets and plans. The territory surrounding 
the city was secured and heavily guarded by the British army. Multiple checkpoints, 
encampments, and troop provisions broke a homogenous and casual community into one 
dominated with the military discipline and suspicion. In that environment, not only it was 
impossible to penetrate the British command, but also it was difficult to get information, which 
was evident to every resident, about troop strength and morale or to transmit popular gossip or 
names of new officers to families or friends living on the other side of the line. The news, 
however, found a way to the American territory through small communication pores left open 
after the occupation, and those channels were paramount to survival of American morale and 
ultimately wartime hardship.  
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 The relationship between the ordinary rebels and Tories in the city, and everywhere else 
in America during the war, was not antagonistic nor characterized with the animosity as one 
between the armies and leaders; instead, it was ambiguous. Both lines were marked with the 
massive population of the displaced, uprooted, people who were placed, to them, into unknown 
communities within the proximity of army and subject to the martial law. Constant relocation of 
civilians, plunder, and seizure of private property by the people with a similar background 
became an everyday reality.103 With families scattered on both sides and territories, the residents 
had to demand relief from the government, but, as Judith L. Van Buskirk argues, they found 
none; instead, the institutions demanded more sacrifice.104 Therefore, they turned to personal 
networks used before the war. Even though many friends, kin members, or acquaintances of 
them were ideologically opposite, they shared the same language, traditions, ambitions, and 
quasi-mutual respect. From prominent figures, such as John Jay or Governor Morris, to ordinary 
farmers, Americans, but British too, survived the war by using this unique wartime invention. 
“Ties of family and friendship,” as Van Buskirk describes, “often proved more important to 
Americans caught in the coils of revolution than did military or political differences.”105Besides 
the aforementioned reasons, economic ambition and want for profit were, and remained, the 
main catalysator and keeper of the latter channel.  
 A disparity between goods sold in New York and within American lines was immense. 
Because of the British Royal Navy’s control of the sea, luxury items such as German mustard, 
Spanish Olives, Tea or Indian spices were regularly available in the city.106 The Patriots, on the 
other hand, had a vast stockpile of meat and milk and control of rural areas. With the mutual 
market closed due to conflict, both sides had to find a way to interact with each other and 
exchange products, and, thus, illegal trading became a lucrative practice. 
 The Black market, popularly known as the “London trade,” was busy and crowded with 
people from all milieus, even the ideologically hard-core patriots participated in it. Suddenly, 
ideology and respect of ad hoc lines did not matter; the only thing that mattered was profit.107 
The trade offered the single channel through which Americans were able to exchange their good 
for the hard currency, the British pound, and, hence, avoided being paid in the continental 
currency. Similarly, the British merchants smuggled necessary food supplies and had a 
monopoly over the latter’s prices, especially during the shortages. The British, however, found a 
way to utilize the Patriot’s monetary need for political purposes as well. They used it to overflow 
the enemy with the continental currency, an attempt to destroy the American credit. Presumably, 
the British secret service also used it to get information out of the commander in chief’s 
headquarters and military camps. This practice, together with the excessive usage of the flag of 
truce and refugee migration, caused confusion and alarm in the American command.  
 The Continental Congress and some prominent American politicians called George 
Washington to act and ban the “London Trade” and punish intruders. The main reason behind 
that was fear of economic collapse, loss of wartime morale, and penetration of the political and 
military structure. Washington was, however, at first reluctant, rather he procrastinated, to do 
                                                          
103 Judith L. Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies: Patriots and Loyalists in Revolutionary New York (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002). 
104 Ibid., 2-3 
105 Ibid., 3 




anything about it, but soon realized that it could be fatal and, thus, decided to act and introduce 
draconic punishments for all involved. When the commander in chief chose to tackle the 
smuggling practice, he also regulated the flag of truce usage and landing sites. The British would 
eventually do the same because of the common fear. Even though both parties decided to control 
the illegal trade, the practice continued until the end of the conflict in 1783. The channel would 
be secretly used by Washington’s secret intelligence in the future, which was understandable and 
logical. Without dedicated patriots willing to go or living in that military powerhouse, New York 
City, and couriers, American chances of outmaneuvering the enemy were slim.  
 On August 7th, 1778, Caleb Brewster offered his intelligence services to George 
Washington. That letter was lost but George Washington’s reply of the next day provides us with 
insight into Washington’s reasoning regarding the enemy and was one of the founding 
documents of the most successful American Revolutionary Spy Ring, the Culper Ring.108 
Together with the well-established notion of the importance of accurate and timely delivered 
messages, George Washington adopted a more mature view on the personality of his secret 
agents. First, the commander in chief recommended to Brewster that it is necessary to “use every 
possible means to obtain intelligence of the Enemys motions.” The alias and creative collection 
techniques were crucial for the success of the operation. The goal was to win over the superior 
British counterintelligence; although it was more powerful in the military might than in the 
collection services, it could not be underestimated. Brewster’s task was to report on the naval 
movements and the position of the British troops, which was the prime concern for the newly 
arrived French fleet. But Brewster would not be able to record the British fleet’s position nor 
deliver timely information without employing residents, who would easily access the British 
naval sights, or usage of other tools that would not raise the suspicion. “Do not spare any 
reasonable expence,” Washington warned Brewster, “to come at early & true information; 
always recollecting, & bearing in mind, that vague, & uncertain accts of things, on which any 
plan is to be formed or executed is more distressing & dangerous than receiving none at all.” 
Washington wanted to receive vetted and detailed reports that could not be easily scrutinized nor 
be part of the enemy’s plot to deceive the Americans. The foundation of the bigger organization 
was laid down.  
  The decision to permit Brewster to spy on the enemy proved to be a good investment. He 
provided the headquarters with the qualitative intelligence that gave to the leadership sense of the 
British naval strength and position, but also the notion of accessibility and similar economic 
desires between Tories and Patriots. The only critique was the question of management. 
Frequently, information delivered would be a couple of days old, although that was better than 
none, Washington wanted to employ more agents and centralize the ring. The transactional 
collection was not long-term efficient. Because of the lack of logistical capabilities, Brewster 
would continue to deliver information in the same manner during the critical moments and more 
peaceful developments. Washington, therefore, decided to appoint General Charles Scott, who 
oversaw the light infantry and fought at Trenton, Germantown, and Monmouth, to manage 
Brewster and find new agents.109 Again, Benjamin Tallmadge was chosen as a deputy to his 
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highest-ranking intelligence officer. However, because of Scott’s other assignments, he was 
given immense autonomy over the secret service. 
Inspired with Sackett and his previous experience, Tallmadge wanted to have an asset 
permanently residing in the enemy territory who would utilize various sources to gather 
information about the British troops regularly, and discreetly passed that information over the 
Sound. He understood that the war effort and sustainability of the intelligence collection required 
non-military personnel who would not come to the temptation to salute to their or enemy’s 
superiors. He was, however, aware that ordinary citizens would not be able to stay in character 
unless their alias was somehow connected to their background and personality. As it was evident 
during the Iran hostage crisis, it was apparent during the war for independence. With the realistic 
covers, it was not hard to portray sources as the British sympathizers and secure the confidence 
within Loyalists circles. If the preparation work was done professionally, agents could work 
actively and mingle unsuspectedly with the enemy. When his services would no longer be 
needed, the agent would return to his regular every-day routine, such as farming, and wait for the 
potential next assignment.  This perspective was not only prudent because the case officer would 
not have to continually worry about the penetration and exfiltration strategy, but also because it 
opened new opportunities that were unimaginable before.  
Tallmadge was a man devoted to the smallest detail. Alexander Ross described 
Tallmadge as “obsessively observant,” and a person who was “the only officer in the army 
whose roster of recruits contained not just the usual, humdrum facts—names, date of enlistments, 
discharges, and so forth—but a detailed description of each man’s physiognomy, including his 
eye color, height, build, and complexion.”110 With the person of such a caliber in the de facto 
charge of the clandestine service, Washington’s project was elevated to another level. 
Charles Scott, however, fundamentally disagreed with the Tallmadge’s approach. He 
preferred smaller reconnaissance operations. He wanted to use traditional military scouts and 
send agents on Nathan Hale-style missions and have them out of the British territory after the 
single mission was over.111 Not only because Tallmadge’s view of the service was very 
progressive, abstract, and complex for that time, Scott’s personality, specifically his ego, did not 
allow the general to listen to his subordinates. If Scott saw someone as a threat to his position, he 
would do everything to remove it. He would report them or fire them. As Alexander Ross says, 
he was “a notoriously difficult boss with the history of undermining his subordinates.”112 
Washington, initially, sided with Scott’s tactic, which was not surprising for a leader of an 
intelligence operation in development. If one single-time agent was captured, he would not be 
able to name other agents. Working as a member of the ring, even though the real identity of 
agents was concealed, spies would know each other and, if arrested, they would be able to tell 
the British about dead drops, contacts, and tactics used. Scott’s dissent did not discourage 
Tallmadge from experimenting with his approach.  
Tallmadge chose his fellow Setauket native and a friend Abraham Woodhull to be his 
principal asset in New York. He would collect intelligence within the city walls, ride back to 
Setauket and pass it to Brewster who would deliver it to Tallmadge. After the information was 
analyzed, it would be passed to Scott and Washington.  
Abraham Woodhull was a farmer and, thus, his trips to New York would not raise any 
suspicion among the British. His experience, also, with the notorious smugglers and the London 
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Trade provided him with the expertise necessary to maintain his cover. Washington supported 
Tallmadge’s man, and, on August 25, he told Tallmadge that he “should be perfectly convinced 
of the Integrety of W—— previous to his imbarking in the business proposed—this being done I 
[Washington] shall be happy in employing him.”113  
Woodhull’s extracurricular activity, smuggling, did not bother the commander in chief 
even in the wake of Congress’ war against the illicit trade. Washington believed, as Alexander 
Ross argues, if Woodhull “could smuggle goods,” he “could also smuggle information.”114 
Before he started his service, Woodhull wanted to meet Washington, but the general dismissed 
the idea as not prudent. “There will be an impropriety,” Washington explicitly stated, “in his 
[Woodhull’s] coming with you to head Quarters, as a knowledge of that circumstance in the 
enemy might blast the whole design.”115 Security of assets and operation was Washington’s high 
priority.  
To strengthen Woodhull’s position among Tories, especially after he was quickly 
released from American custody after he was detained while crossing the Sound between 
Connecticut and Long Island, Tallmadge decided to encourage Woodhull to take the newly 
created oath to the King by the Carlisle Commission, which was sent to America to negotiate the 
cessation of the hostilities. Woodhull should, Tallmadge told Washington, “take the benefit of 
the same and serve as in his present capacity,” and as a friend of the King would have “a better 
opportunity of acquainting with their proceedings.”116 Woodhull consented.  
 Also, Tallmadge on Washington’s encouragement recommended that in the official 
correspondence members of the network use alias instead of their real names. Tallmadge became 
John Bolton and Woodhull Samuel Culper.  As Alexander Ross explains, “Washington, Scott, 
and Tallmadge collaborated to invent the latter code name. Samuel Culper’s reversed initials are 
those of Charles Scott, while Washington lightheartedly amended the name of Culpeper County 
in Virginia—where, aged seventeen, he had worked as a surveyor back in 1749—to ‘Culper.’”117 
Samuel was chosen based on the name of Benjamin Tallmadge’s brother. Caleb Brewster was 
the only member who refused the alias and preferred his real name. Even though Scott initially 
supported Tallmadge’s source, who was way more productive than his own agents, he started to 
undermine Tallmadge’s authority and do everything to discredit Woodhull in the fall of 1778.  
However, abruptly, General Scott, after serving as a chief intelligence officer for a couple 
of months, resigned in October of 1778. “My unhappy Misfortuns,” Scott stated, “make It 
indispensably Necessary that I should leave the armey in a few weaks… in Mean time be assurd 
Sir that it is not Choice but Mear Necessaty that Compells the Measure.”118 Not only Scott 
personal and family problems were behind his departure but also Benjamin Tallmadge. 
Scott and Tallmadge had a strained relationship. Tallmadge complained about Scott’s 
attitude and ignorance of his asset on Long Island, Samuel Culper. In a letter to Scott, October 
29, 1778, Tallmadge informed him of receiving a message from Culper and explicitly stated that 
he believes the information was accurate.119 Scott explained that he disregarded report not 
because it was inaccurate, but because it was not received “‘through the proper channel’ and 
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therefore ‘I did not give the credit to it.’”120 That relationship was not sustaining. After Scott’s 
resignation, George Washington elevated Benjamin Tallmadge to a vacant position and 
encouraged him to continue to develop his incognito network on Long Island.  
Soon after dispatching a letter to Tallmadge October 29th, 1778, Woodhull became 
reluctant and refused to transmit any information in writing. Brewster and Tallmadge, however, 
promised him that no one except them and the commander in chief would know his real identity 
and that all correspondence would be copied and destroyed after it was read. Tallmadge’s writing 
concealed the identity of the actual asset in the city. With that promise in mind, Woodhull 
continued to serve the American cause and write numerous epistle reports that provided the 
headquarters with the valuable, but very often open-source, information. 
Woodhull embarked on a dangerous fifty-five-mile journey to New York City regularly 
without no one to accompany him. He had to continually maintain his cover, a farmer on a 
business trip, and pass through territory controlled by the British plunders, smugglers and troops 
respectively. When in the city, Woodhull would stay at Amos Underhill’s place, who was his 
brother-in-law through his sister.  Together with the latter he would observe British movements 
and collect information that he would write down on a piece of paper and carry it back to 
Setauket where Brewster or his one-time sailors would smuggle it across the sound and deliver it 
to Tallmadge and Washington.  
Even though Washington appreciated Culper’s service, he complained to Tallmadge that 
Woodhull’s letters, characterized with the provincial colloquialism, were vague and very often 
delivered late, which was fatal for the precise military planning. “I wish you would request,” 
Washington asserted, “the person whom you formerly recommended to me, and who Gen. Scott 
tells me, to correspond with you, to ascertain the following facts with as much precision and 
expedition, as possible.”121 The delivery delay, however, was not Woodhull’s fault; instead, it 
depended on Brewster, but especially on his crew who weren’t aware of the true nature of the 
operation and, thus, could not request leave from their military duty. They thought that the 
business they attended to was yet another smuggling assignment.  
With dependent members of his family in Setauket and constant fear of possible capture, 
Woodhull was reluctant to travel to the City regularly. By the winter of 1778, he resided at 
Underhill’s house and done most of the spy work from there. He occasionally traversed back to 
Setauket. On November 29, 1778, in a letter to Tallmadge, Washington again recognized 
appreciation for the Culper’s services but shared again his dissatisfaction with the late reports. 
“At the same time,” Washington asserted, “I am at a loss how it can be conveniently carried on, 
as he is so scrupulous respecting the channel of conveyance.”122 Not only delay was caused by 
Woodhull, but also Tallmadge who had to pick-up information from Brewster and then travel to 
the headquarters.  Washington thought the establishment of the independent courier service was 
a solution to that occurring problem. “I wish you could fix upon some officer at Danbury,” the 
general requested, “in whose discretion your correspondent would be willing to confide; or 
perhaps the matter might be so managed, that his communications might be conveyed through 
that officer without his knowing from whom they came.”123 Tallmadge accepted the proposal and 
established the chain of the couriers from his encampment to the commander in chief, but he had 
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a harder time to find someone to carry information from Woodhull in New York to Brewster in 
the bay surrounding Setauket.  
Tallmadge recruited Jonas Hawkins, who was childhood acquaintance of Woodhull, 
Brewster, and Tallmadge, to serve as a courier between the City and Setauket. “as from the 
Regularity of his Dispatches,” Tallmadge assured Washington, “ & the Characters of the Persons 
who I know are intrusted with their Conveyance from N.Y. to Brook Haven, I dare venture to say 
there is not the least probability, & I had almost said hardly a possibility of a Discovery.”124 Very 
soon, another Setauket resident and buyer of Woodhull’s tavern, Austin Roe, joined 
Washington’s secret postal service and, it is fair to say, was principal asset serving in that branch 
of clandestine service. 
 “At this stage,” Alexander Rose correctly concluded, “the growing cell was recruiting 
solely from the ranks of men its members knew they could trust implicitly, men who shared their 
religion, blood, class, and creed.”125 With limiting recruitment to the family or trusted Setauket 
community members, Tallmadge created a homogenous organization that was immune to 
external threats and fear from the enemy’s penetration. Everyone knew everyone and each 
member secured trust not based on someone’s word, but on his actions before, when no one 
imagined that independent secret service would be created, and after the Lexington. It was a 
perfect balance. 
The royal governor of New York, William Tryon, was crafting a plan to break the 
popular support of the American cause—the same strategy that was proven to be fatal for the 
British repeatedly. As Alexander Rose argues, Tryon “had been urging Clinton to authorize the 
use of ‘desolation warfare’ upon the enemy. For Tryon and other Loyalist hard-liners, Clinton’s 
[justifiable] reluctance to countenance attacks on pro-Patriot civilians was evidence of namby-
pambyism; only by punishing popular support for the rebel regime could Americans be wooed 
back into the monarchical fold.”126 Clinton rejected the idea partially but decided to use it as a 
bait for General Washington. He thought if Tryon attacks the Connecticut coastline, Washington 
will leave his headquarters with a massive army to engage with the intruders. Meanwhile, 
Clinton would march to New Jersey and seize his provisions there, and a threat to capture the 
strongholds on Hudson. That maneuver would induce Washington to switch to defense mood and 
retreat, and “thereby allowing Clinton an opportunity to meet him on the field of battle and 
inflict a decisive defeat.”127 
Abraham Woodhull had to traverse through dangerous woods to reach New York, and 
there was a constant threat of his capture by notorious profiteers and marauding gangs of 
Cowboys and Skinners. It was unlikely that Woodhull would not become a victim of the latter. In 
the letter of April 12, 1779, Benjamin Tallmadge informed the general that “Culper was the other 
day robbed of all his money near Huntington, and was glad to escape with his life.”128 Incidents 
such as robbery and harassment might lower the asset’s morale and induce him to quit the 
service. Even worse robbers might suspect or find something that might compromise the whole 
operation. Together with Woodhull’s constant fear of detection and possibility of Tory’s 
questioning of his business trips, these incidents alarmed the headquarters. “Should suspicions of 
him [Samuel Culper] rise so high,” Washington told Tallmadge, “as to render it unsafe to 
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continue in N—— Y—— I would by all means wish him to employ some person of whose 
attachment and abilities he entertains the best opinion, to act in his place.”129 They needed a 
permanent source in the city, especially with the reports of British shipbuilding and a possible 
attack on Connecticut. 
 “It is a matter of great importance,” Washington wrote to Elias Boudinot, his 
commissary-general of prisoners, “to have early & good intelligence of the enemys strength & 
motions—and as far as possible, designs. & to obtain them through different channels. Do you 
think it practicable to come at these by means of —[Pintard]?I shall not press it upon him; but 
you must be sensible that to obtain intelligence from a man of observation near the head Quarters 
of an army from whence all orders flow & every thing originates must be a most desirable 
thing.”130 Washington was alluding that newly appointed commissary of prisoners in New York, 
Lewis Pintard, was his pick for the permanent source in the city. Even though in the Pintard’s 
letter of introduction to General Howe, Washington promised that Pintard was under parole and 
would not engage in the gathering of intelligence, he decided to offer the latter position. Pindar 
would get a bottle of John Jay’s brother’s newly invented ink that required agent and 
counteragent to make the writing visible, hide his practice, and finally reward for his service “at 
a proper season.” Pintard, however, refused to accept the offer on the grounds of potential 
exposure. As he explained in his resignation letter to Washington in 1780, he has already seen as 
a spy and his activities deemed suspicious by the British: 
“Nothwithstanding the most careful Circumspection and exact attention to every part of 
my Conduct, yet such have been the extreme Jealousies & Envy of the Inhabitants of the City, 
that I have been considered as a Person of the most dangerous Principles to the safety of the City, 
as a spy and common Enemy of the British government, and indeed every necessary Act of 
Humanity & Duty that I have shewn to the Prisoners, tho strictly within my permission, has been 
represented as arising from some settled plan, Ruinous to their best Interest—I have been put 
entirely under the Control & Direction of Mr Loring, & therefore subject to his Caprice & 
Humour, and not being considered as acting in any Publick Character, have been treated by him 
with the Utmost Insolence & Contempt. In short such have been the treatment & Contempt that I 
have suffered for three years past, without the least Reason given it on my Part, and that as far as 
I can discover chiefly for want of Acting in a Publick acknowledged Character, that I cannot 
Possibly any longer submit to it.”  
 
Even though Washington did succeed to recruit Pintard, he did not give up with his intention.  
With the failure to recruit a person in New York and the British continued counterintelligence 
success131, Washington asked himself whether the intelligence adventure was worth it. No one, 
however, suspected that Woodhull eventually (aka Samuel Culper) would independently decide 
to leave New York and recruit a new agent. 
 Woodhull’s position was getting tougher and tougher. A paroled man, John Wolsey, 
returning from his imprisonment in Connecticut told notorious Col. Simcoe of the Queens 
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Rangers that Woodhull was up to something; specifically, he “lodged [some] information 
against” Woodhull. Simcoe went to Setauket to investigate the claim, but Woodhull had luckily 
departed for New York a day before the latter’s arrival. Realizing that Woodhull was not at 
home, Col. Simcoe attacked the latter’s father and “plundered him in a most shocking 
manner.”132 Even though he cleared of his name by asking Gen Aid for a favor, Woodhull 
believed that his time in New York was over. “And am sorry,” Samuel Culper told John Bolton, 
“to inform you that it hath rendered me almost unserviceable to you. I purpose quitting 10 [New 
York] and residing at 20 [Setauket]. As I am now a suspected person, I cannot frequent their 
camp as heretofore.”133 Woodhull was aware that the resignation of his New York assignment 
would not help Washington with intelligence collection unless he finds someone to replace him. 
In the letter dated June 20th, Culper informed his superiors that he had communicated the 
business “to an intimate friend and disclosed every secret and laid before him every instruction 
that hath been handed to me; it was with great difficulty I gained his compliance, checked by 
fear…I have reasons to think his advantages for serving you and abilities are far superior to 
mine.”134 The person who had “the interest of our country at heart and of good reputation, 
character, and family as any of my [Woodhull’s] acquaintance” was Robert Townsend, a Quaker 
from the Oster Bay and an occasional roomer at Amos Underhill’s, Woodhull’s brother in law. 
Remarkably, Benjamin Underhill, Amos’s brother and married to the daughter of Sylvanus 
Townsend, and Robert Townsend were business partners. There were other residents in that inn 
that were providing information to the patriots and shared same family root, notably with 
Townsends.  With the recruitment of a permanent source and establishment of the safe house in 
the heart of the British garrison, Woodhull elevated the intelligence operation to another level. 
Now, Washington’s spies had a place to meet whenever they wished without raising any 
suspicion. If somebody asked Woodhull or Townsend why they stayed at the Underhill’s, the 
answer would be a family or business matter.  
 In a letter dated June 27th, 1779, Washington accepted Woodhull’s successor and advised 
that he should quickly convey the information and avoid “giving positive numbers by guess.”135 
Washington knew, however, that the confirmation could not be official without creating an alias 
for Robert Townsend. Because Woodhull recruited him and was his superior officer, Washington 
decided that logically his cover name should be Samuel Culper Jr.  
 In the same June letter, the general said to Tallmadge that “there is a man on York Island 
living on or near the North River, of the name of George Higday who I am told hath given signal 
proofs of his attachment to us, &  at the same time stands well with the enemy.”136 Higday might 
have been qualified for the clandestine job but was arrested before he even embarked on the first 
assignment for the ring. The commander in chief made a cardinal mistake in his June 27th letter. 
Instead of using an alias or just the first letter of source’s name, Washington bluntly used his full 
name and place of residency. It is surprising that person of the caliber such as Washington’s did 
                                                          
132 See Letter, Samuel Culper to John Bolton, June 5, 1779. 
133 See Letter, Woodhull to Tallmadge, June 5, 1779. 
134 See Letter, Woodhull to Tallmadge, June 20, 1779. 
135 See Letter, Washington to Tallmadge, June 27, 1779. 
136 See Letter, Washington to Tallmadge, June 27, 1779. 
34 
 
what he did, but, on the other hand, the general was a busy man and was engaged simultaneously 
in military and clandestine operations. Nothing would happen if the letter did not come into the 
British hands.  
 On July 2, 1779, the British troops under the leadership of Colonel Banastre Tarleton 
unexpectedly attacked Tallmadge’s encampment and surprised unprepared soldiers of the Second 
Light Dragoons. The raid was neutralized with the help of the local militia, but Tallmadge was 
left with ten casualties and eight soldiers captured. The raiders also took twelve horses, including 
Tallmadge’s, “whose saddlebags had contained twenty guineas from Washington intended for 
Woodhull and, worse,” his letter of June 27 mentioning George Higday.137 With previously 
intercepted Washington’s June 13 letter, which mentioned C---r and American usage of the 
invisible ink, and newly acquired letter, Howe knew that Washington established a secret service 
with Benjamin Tallmadge as its chief officer and used a powerful new weapon to hide the real 
message and deceive the British. The element of surprise was over, and a hunt of the unnamed 
spy and chief officer was on. Before they dealt with the bigger fish, logically, the British had to 
deal with the source named in the captured letter. If he knew something, he might give them a 
clue that might lead them to C---r. The British troops went to Higday’s home and arrested him. 
In his confession, Higday accused Washington of blackmailing because his past services for the 
latter were not based on the ideology but money.138 Eventually, he was released from the custody 
and went back to his farm. Howe knew that keeping him was not a requisite. He could not be 
used as a double agent nor knew anything about Washington’s service. On the other hand, 
Washington lost yet another possible agent, but this incident provided him and Tallmadge with 
the valuable experience.139  
 Even though Washington provided spies with the American invented invisible ink, 
known as Sir James Jay’s “sympathetic ink,” that was revolutionary, the stockpile of that 
chemical was scarce given to the difficulty of acquiring substances for the mix, complexity, and 
secrecy of receipt. Not only liquid to be used to convey the message but also “a counter liquor 
(rubbed over the paper afterwards),” had to be produced. “I beg that no mention,” Washington 
told Samuel Culper, “may ever be made of your having received such liquids from me or anyone 
else. In all cases and at all times this procedure and circumspection is necessary, but it is 
indispensably so now as I am informed that Govr. Tryon has a preparation of the same acid or 
something similar to it, which might lead to a detection if it is ever known that a matter of this 
sort has passed from me.”140 With the necessity of concealing the existence of this revolutionary 
patent, Washington also had to balance his spies’ and his intelligence desires with his scarce 
funds. James Jay told him that he was more than willing to provide him with more ink but that 
financial burden caused by the “new System of Finance” resulted in the delay of production.   
 Both Culpers had always been low on the stain and constantly demanded more ink. Their 
fear of detection was probably the leading cause of excessive usage of the latter substance, which 
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is justifiable. Notably, in April 12 letter to Washington, Tallmadge explained that when Abraham 
Woodhull was working on an intelligence report for the commander in chief, two people 
unexpectedly and uninvited entered his private chambers. He immediately destroyed the vial and 
papers. Even though he did not see who the intruders were, Woodhull was aware that several 
British officers were quartered in the next-door room and sensed that he might have been 
detected. The two, luckily, were ladies who just wanted to surprise him. The incident, however, 
proved how dangerous the secret world was and how careful the intelligence officer had to be, 
especially with using the powerful secret weapon. Because of incidents like this, Tallmadge and 
Washington decided that the invisible ink could not be the only security measure used by their 
assets. The need to use codes and to encipher the letters was the only plausible alternative. 
 Benjamin Tallmadge created a cipher almost from scratch. He had to be careful to avoid 
usage of code for the common words and articles. If the British counterintelligence realized the 
symbol of a substantive letter or a word for the easily identifiable word, the rest of the code 
could be easily cracked down. Even though Tallmadge’s lacked resources to develop 
professional diplomatic cipher nor was able to provide education of his spies, he extended 
smaller code the Culpers’ had already used and created a system based on the substitution. 
Instead of writing New York, Setauket or names of the two “Post riders,” Austin Roe and Jonas 
Hawkins, in his letters, Woodhull would use numbers 10, 20, 30 and 40 respectively. With that 
in mind, Tallmadge took John Entick’s New Spelling Dictionary and started crafting a codebook. 
In the left column of his book, he copied the words he deemed most useful in the alphabetical 
order, and onto the right side, consecutive numbers. He also ciphered the names of the prominent 
members of the ring such as Woodhull, Washington, Brewster and himself. The words or digits, 
however, that did not have appropriate symbol would be encrypted by using “mixed-alphabet 
scheme.”141 The final product was the following:  
                                                          






However, when the ink was available, Washington and his spies preferred to use that secret 
weapon instead of only using code to conceal the real message. The message could have been 
written on the blank book pages or margins. “I mean that he [Townsend] should occasionally 
write,” Washington told Tallmadge, “his information on the blank leaves of a pamphlet—on the 
first-second &c. pages of a common pocket book—on the blank leaves at each end of registers 
for the year—almanacks, or any new publication—or book of small value.” The informer did not 
have to worry whether the message written in the letter makes sense nor whether it would be 
intercepted. If someone requested to see the book, he would not see anything suspicious nor 
different from another book with the same title. The only thing that Culpers had to make sure 
was that the paper was of good quality because the ink was not legible on the cheap paper,142 
which sometimes happened with letters Washington received. If they were sending letters, they 
would usually write them in a Tory style with a mixture of family matters and conceal the secret 
message, written with Jay’s ink, between the lines and on the remaining parts of the sheet.143 In 
1780, after the British become aware of the possible arrival of the French navy, the Culpers 
started to address the letters to the prominent Setauket loyalists with fictitious message to secure 
the Culper Ring’s couriers from unnecessary searches and interrogations by the British 
authorities, even though the real Tories had never received them nor were aware of Patriot’s 
usage of their names as a cover. The usage of the cipher, fake letters to pro-British neighbors and 
invisible ink might have been a better option than adopting Clinton’s secret weapon, the Cardan 
system, but the reality was probably that they weren’t aware of Clinton’s practice.  
 Sir Henry Clinton used a system created by the Italian code-breaker Geronimo Cardano 
in the sixteenth century that required a grille or a mask to read the hidden message. The writer 
had to write a fake intelligence report that made sense to conceal the real information within the 
lines, which required special writing skills. On its face the letter would look like the credible 
intelligence report and, if intercepted, the reader would not worry about deciphering it, unless he 
was aware of the system used and had the grille, which was highly unlikely. The mask and the 
message would be sent to the receiver separately to limit the possibility of detection. If one of the 
two items was captured, the sender would know it and replace the grille and continue to operate 
without having to replace the whole code system as it would happen if the code was 
compromised. Even though it was a very complex system, it was safer than both codes and ink. 
Eventually, however, Washington’s concealment system in conjunction with his revolutionary 
spying technique proved to be more advanced than Clinton’s.  
 Even with the security measures, both Abraham Woodhull and Robert Townsend were 
still paranoid about the possible detection. In a letter to Tallmadge, dated July 29, Robert 
Townsend requests discontinuance of his service, if his intelligence gathering was no longer 
required. Townsend describes, “the times now are extremely difficult—guard boats are kept out 
every night in the North and East Rivers to prevent any boats from passing, & I am informed that 
some persons have been searched on Long Island; therefore whenever you think that my 
intelligence is of no service, beg you will notify me, ‘till which time I will continue as usual.”144 
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He continued to gather intelligence for the general, but a couple of months later, the question of 
the security reemerged. When Woodhull was traveling through the countryside, carrying Culper 
Jr. letter, he was attached by some armed men. One of the robbers was a man whom Woodhull 
frequently had seen in New York. Even though they “searched every pocket and lining of my 
[Woodhull’s] clothes, shoes,” and his saddle, luckily, the robbers did not find the letter, which 
was hidden somewhere in the saddle. 145  
 Washington was logically concerned with the internal security lapses and the external 
threats to his secret service, but he knew that with the expected arrival of the French fleet the 
intelligence gathering had to accelerate and his agents be willing to risk their lives for the cause. 
He also renewed the call for a more timely intelligence and in a letter, dated February 5, 1780, 
Washington expressed his earnest desire that Tallmadge would “press him [Townsend] to open, 
if possible, a communication” with him “by a more direct route then the present.”146 Due to the 
long and circuitous route, Robert Townsend’s “intelligent, clear, and satisfactory” accounts were 
usually delayed and, thus, their value and possible American advantage diminished.147  
 Typically, Roe would pick-up Robert Townsend’s report in New York, conceal it among 
the purchased articles and paper, and carry it to Setauket, where he immediately after arrival 
would check his cattle on Woodhull’s land. He would leave the message in a box hidden in the 
field. Woodhull then supposedly accidentally passing through his own property would uncover 
the box and took the letter with him.148 With a dead-drop concealed on a property that both 
agents had access to and could claim the ownership of it, no one would suspect that some 
suspicious activity was occurring in their neighbors’ garden.  At home, Woodhull would analyze 
and supplement the information with other intelligence. To signal Brewster that the packet was 
ready, Woodhull would tell the agent 355, Anna Smith Strong, to hang clothing on the 
clothesline on the Strong’s neck with a black petticoat indicating Brewster where to land. There 
were six possible landing places and six clothes hanging on the line. With messages in his hand, 
Brewster rowed back to Connecticut and forwarded packet to Tallmadge and the headquarters. 
However, to satisfy Washington’s request, Townsend recruited a courier, his cousin James who 
got himself captured by the Americans.149 This incident, together with the idea of the British 
spies within the army, traumatized Robert Townsend, who refused to continue his service.150 If 
any person can be pointed out,” Culper Sr. told Tallmadge in a letter, dated May 4, 1780, “by 
711 at N.Y. who can be safely relayed on to supply C. Junr’s place, I will make myself known to 
him, and settle a plan for the purpose.” However, because of the delay of intelligence, 
Washington decided to temporarily cease the operations of the ring and told Tallmadge that 
Culper Sr. might be employed again in the summer.151 He also announced his desire to open a 
communication channel with New York City across Staten Island.152 Upon receiving 
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Washington’s letter, Woodhull was surprised and shocked by Washington’s words. He wrote to 
Tallmadge, “Sorry we have been at so much cost and trouble for little or no purpose.” However, 
upon realization of the importance of the Ring’s operations, Washington decided to reactivate his 
agents. “As we may,” Washington told Tallmadge, “every moment expect the arrival of French 
Fleet a revival of the correspondence with the Culpers will be of very great importance.”153 The 
Ring was back in the business. The British, however, were also aware of the arrival of the fleet 
and they tightened up their security measures to block any flow of information from the city.  
 “The enclosed requires your immediate departure,” Woodhull wrote to Tallmadge upon 
receiving a message from Culper Jr., “this day by all means let not an hour pass: for this day 
must not be lost.”154  The British admiral Graves sailed for Rhode Island, a place of landing of 
the French fleet. Woodhull quickly summarized the message and forward it to Tallmadge, who 
sent it to the headquarters as soon as he received it. Washington was out of camp and was 
expected to return later that evening. But with a message of such an urgency that could not be 
possible.  Alexander Hamilton, Washington’s aide-de-camp, opened the letter and forwarded 
content to Marquis de Lafayette. Upon return of the commander in chief, the Americans prepared 
the deception strategy and sent a “package that continued details of a plan of attack on New York 
City.”155 The information was delivered to the British outpost by someone who supposedly 
claimed that he found information on the road. With Washington’s letter in their hands, the fleet 
was recalled and returned to the city. They waited for the attack that never had happened. Comte 
de Rochambeau successfully arrived in Rhode Island. This was Culper’s one of the most critical 
operations and was a mere proof of their importance.  
 During the summer of the same year, the Culper ring got a new member, George Smith of 
Nissequougue, and everything looked bright for the Culpers.156 However, new external troubles 
and the British counterintelligence capabilities scared and demoralized our brave gang. The 
ring’s works would eventually slow down. Nothing, but the long correspondence and the 
defection of the senior American officer, Benedict Arnold, and the events following it, sounded 
the loudest alarm in Washington’s intelligence camp and caused rapid resignations, and 
ultimately halt of the operations. 
 After long clandestine communication, usage of the Bailey’s Dictionary as the key code, 
Sir Henry Clinton’s questioning of the source’s true identity, John Andre, arriving on the British 
ship Volture and clandestinely smuggled by Arnold’s entourage into the American territory, 
finally met Benedict Arnold on September 21. There are no official records of the meeting 
available.157 The only thing we know is that the general gave Andre six documents describing the 
garrison at the West Point and its strength. He also said to the major that George Washington 
would be at the West Point the next morning. With the fortification’s plans in Andre’s hands and 
the news of the commander in chief’s arrival, the British had a wild card in their pocket that 
might have ended the conflict in their favor. Meanwhile, the Americans noticed the ship and 
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moved their artillery to the riverbank and started with the warning shots. The boat had to move 
downstream and leave Andre within American lines.158  
 Arnold, thus, did not have any other option than to issue to his visitor a passport, advise 
him to change into civilian clothes to avoid being recognized, and provide Andre with the horse 
and a guide. With Andre’s departure, Arnold returned to his house, near the West Point, to 
welcome the commander in chief like nothing had have happened.  However, unexpectedly, the 
news reached Arnold that a person bearing his pass was captured by the three profiteers, John 
Paulding, Isaac Van Wart, and David Williams, and, upon finding incriminating documents in 
his boots, he was turned in to the American authorities. Arnold knew that he was in trouble. It 
was a question of time before someone realized who a mysterious Andre’ contact was.  
 Arnold immediately left his home under the pretense of the urgent business at the West 
Point and advised his staff that he would be back for breakfast with Washington; instead, he rode 
to the riverbank and boarded Vulture before even Washington knew anything about the 
conspiracy. With Arnold behind the lines, the general could not do anything else than to 
interrogate and punish the captive, John Andre, and to calm down Arnold’s hysterical wife, 
Peggy, who claimed that she did not know anything about the incident. 
 Immediately following his capture, John Andre wrote a letter to Washington, and identify 
himself as Adjutant General to Sir Clinton and requested a permission to send couple of letters 
and discussed the “condition of some gentlemen at Charlestown who, being either on parole or 
under protection, were engaged in a conspiracy” against the British government.159 However, 
with the captured British spy in his hands and the still-fresh memory of Nathan Hale’s execution, 
Washington knew that any exchange would not be possible unless the British were willing to 
turn in Benedict Arnold to Americans.  
 To encourage further defections and ultimately to demoralize the Continental Army, 
Clinton understood that he could not agree to those terms, even though he admired Andre like his 
biological son. Washington, thus, could not do more than call the Court Martial into a session. 
The court decided that given to the specifics of the case Andre should be executed. Because of 
his rank, however, they initially weren’t sure whether the firing squad or gibbet would be used. 
Ultimately, Andre’s decision to change his clothes, which was contradictory to Clinton’s 
guidelines, decided his faith. John Andre would be hanged.  
 Benjamin Tallmadge, who spent time with Andre during the trail and escorted him to the 
place of execution, noted that he felt affection toward the latter. He knew Andre was like him; he 
might have been the one who was being executed if the whole incident happened in reverse. His 
top priority, thus, was to assess the impact this incident had on the Culper Ring and its members. 
 With Arnold’s knowledge of Tallmadge being a chief intelligence officer and 
unsuccessful attempt to procure from Tallmadge information about the members of the Culper 
Ring, the ring’s leadership, Woodhull, and Townsend were afraid of possible discovery. The 
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threat did not stop there. After the incident, Benedict Arnold sent letters to the American officers 
and encouraged further treachery. Benjamin Tallmadge was one of senior Washington’s advisors 
who got an invitation from Arnold to “join him with as many men as you [Tallmadge] can bring 
over with you [him].”160 Even though Tallmadge rejected, no one knew how many letters like 
this were sent out and how many people knew or suspected about Washington’s intelligence 
capabilities. This together with the arrival of reports that the British were closing in on the 
Culper’s alarmed Woodhull and Townsend. 
 Henry Vandycke, a British source in Connecticut, informed the British chief intelligence 
officer Oliver DeLancey that “there is one [Caleb] Brewster who has the direction of three whale 
boats that constantly come over from Connecticut shore once a week for the purpose of obtaining 
intelligence. They land at Dawn Meadow bay.”161 Soon the British acquired more information 
from some officer in the American army for money about Brewster. Their source promised them 
to find out more detailed information about the members, but his initial report enabled the British 
to identify Austin Roe, Phillip Roe, and James Smith as couriers for the mysterious ring. 
Eventually, they will find out that all intelligence went via Setauket to Brewster.162  
 “Private dispatches,” Heron, another British spy, told DeLancey, “are frequently sent 
from your city to the chieftain here by some traitors, they come by the way of Setalket where a 
certain Brewster receives them at or near a certain woman’s.”163 It was just a question of time 
when people would recall the suspicious release of Woodhull from the American custody or his 
constant travels to New York.Moreover, an ordinary observation of Roe’s and Brewster’s 
activities on Long Island would provide them with a clue about who else was involved in the 
secret service. And, finally, capture and interrogation of known spies might provide them with 
the evidence of some other resident’s treason. The British had almost all pieces of the puzzle in 
their hands, and Woodhull and Townsend were aware of that. Culper Jr., however, was the first 
who said it was enough. 
 After Arnold’s defection and the discovery of Brewster’s secret activity, Robert 
Townsend no longer wanted to collect and provide information to Washington in writing, but 
only orally. He did not want to see his letter falling into the British hands.164 In May 1781, 
Woodhull went to New York to find someone to take Culper Jr.’s place, but he was not 
successful; no one was willing to write.165 “The enemy,” Woodhull in his letter to Tallmadge, 
dated May 19, 1781, stated, “have got some hint of me for when passing at Brooklyn Ferry was 
strictly examined and told some villain supported a correspondence from this place [New 
York].” He further requested to be “relieved” from his “present anxiety”; he did not longer want 
to travel to the city nor submit his reports in writing.166 On June 4, 1781, Woodhull told 
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Tallmadge, that they “live in daily fear of death and destruction…I dare not to visit New York 
myself, and those that have been employed will serve no longer, through fear.”167 With the fear 
of possible capture, the Culper members one by one left their positions. The ring’s operations 
gradually ceased. Now, after we narrated Culper ring’s adventures and services, it is time to 
understand why so many people decided to join Washington and risk their lives for the cause 
whose success was barely known to many. And, finally, why the British counterintelligence was 
never able to connect the dots and identify all members of Washington’s secret service.  
III. Epilogue 
 The eighteenth-century colonial settlements were small places where everyone knew each 
other and whose friendships were interwoven with family connections. From weddings to 
funerals, people always gathered and shared their feelings. They also all interacted with each 
other through business dealings, landlord-renter relationship, and employment. No matter 
whether they were Tories or Whigs. The success of community depended on every resident and 
their cooperation.  
 The pre-controversy colonial settlements, as we already mentioned, were homogenous 
and autonomous. The colonial map was covered with hundreds of villages and towns that were 
different from each other, and very often maintained a constrained relationship with their 
neighbors. With the British push to retake the full control over the colonies and to subordinate 
residents to the crown, these homogenous communities suddenly became violent and divided; a 
situation that worsened with the arrival of the British troops in America.  Family members or 
friends harassed, arrested, and executed. Property destroyed or seized. Streets filled with 
hundreds and hundreds of displaced people. Stores, shops, and farms burned, ransacked, or 
closed. This became a reality, and no one was exempt from this experience. Eventually, every 
person found a way how to cope with this trauma; and many decided to risk their lives and serve 
the cause. They just wanted the British out of their communities. The members of the Culper ring 
were not exempt from this process. Setauket, Oyster Bay, and other places on Long Island 
experienced this torture the loudest. 
 The Culper Ring’s case officer, Benjamin Tallmadge, who was preacher’s son and well 
“versed in the Latin and Greek languages,” develop a solid friendship with his brother in arms, 
Nathan Hale, during his education at Yale University.168 Their relationship was frank and filled 
with dedication to themselves and their native land. Hale and Tallmadge were constantly 
discussing radical topics of the day and were challenging the reality all the time. In one way they 
were idealist, but their love of discussion, learning, and enlightenment ideas, which would be 
elevated to another level in the time of Lexington and Concord, could not be disputed nor 
matched. They also had a tremendous influence on each other. With a strong fraternal bond, 
nothing else was left, than to promise each other, as Alexander Rose argues, “If anything malign 
ever happened to one, the other would be merciless toward his assailants.”169 This sense of 
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loyalty and patriotism was nothing unordinary for the Yale students during the years leading to 
and during the Anglo-American controversy. The school was a bastion of the revolutionary 
thought, camaraderie, and democracy. Students were boycotting British goods, accusing the 
mother country of corruption, and rejecting the idea of subordination to the crown. With the first 
shots at Lexington and Concord, Yale’s patriotic zeal came to a test. Many students and alumni 
joined the fight for the cause. Hale and Tallmadge were one of them. 
  “I consider our country,” Tallmadge wrote to Hale in a letter, dated July 4, 1775, “a land 
flowing as it were with milk &honey holding open her arms, &demanding assistance from all 
who can assist her in her sore distress ….[w]e all should be ready to step forth in the common 
cause.”170 With these words in mind, Hale joined the armed forces immediately following the 
official declaration of the war. Tallmadge, on the other hand, waited for a year and then when he 
was one-hundred percent sure that his loyalty to the new nation was not questionable, he took a 
musket and joined fellow Patriots in a fight for natural rights. “While I was in Cambridge with 
my military friends,” Tallmadge described years later, “I was continually importuned to think of 
the oppression which was so abundantly exhibited by the British government towards the 
Colonies, until I finally became an entirely devoted to the cause in which my country was 
compelled to engage. I finally began to think seriously of putting on the uniform, and returned to 
Weathersfield full of zeal in the cause of my country.”171 However, the death of his best friend 
on the British gallows induced him to confirm his ideological motivation and to fight even harder 
and punish the British for his loss. Tallmadge’s personality and his view of the Anglo-American 
conflict were forever changed by this incident. Thus, when Washington offered him a position in 
his secret service, Tallmadge could not reject it. He immediately went to work and created a 
nucleus of a new ring.  
 The Culper Ring’s crucial member was Caleb Brewster, a man of adventure and 
wilderness, without whom Culper Sr.’s and Jr.’s letters would not reach George Washington’s 
desk. This Setauket native learned his craft in the dark, cold, and dangerous waters near 
Greenland, waiting for the whale to be captured. He was a whale boatman since he escaped the 
boredom of his home when he was nineteen years old. Soon he would replace whaler with a 
merchant ship where he served as a mate. In May 1775, he would support Salah Strong’s 
candidacy to be a delegate to the Provincial Congress, and when the war started, he immediately 
took the musket and joined the band of brothers. For Brewster, it was a simple question, if not 
me then who?172 
 Brewster offered his intelligence services to Washington not only because he wanted a 
new adventure but because he was enthusiastic about the cause; he wanted to make a change and 
serve side by side with his friends and relatives. Brewster’s want for adventure can be seen in his 
refusal to use an alias. He always used his full name to sign reports and other documents. He was 
not afraid of capture. The same could be seen in his decision to act as a courier across the Sound, 
a dangerous bay packed, as we have already seen, with smugglers and profiteers. However, for 
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Brewster, there was nothing better than help his friends, no matter how difficult it was, to defeat 
the British. The surprise attack on the Setauket’s British headquarters and Colonel Hewlett, 
located at the local Presbyterian church ministered by Benjamin Tallmadge’s father, was for sure 
one of Brewster’s favorite operations in which he took part. Even though two other Culper Ring 
member, Abraham Woodhull (aka Samuel Culper Sr.) and Robert Townsend (aka Samuel Culper 
Jr.), lacked military stamina Tallmadge and Brewster posed, they possessed extraordinary 
cleverness and loyalty to the cause that could have not been matched by their British 
counterparts. 
 Abraham Woodhull, an ancestor of Richard Woodhull, an extraordinary Setauket mayor, 
lived on the family farm with his elderly parents, and after his brothers’ death he took over the 
family business. He joined Suffolk militia in 1775, but, after a couple of months, he went back 
home. The martial spirit did not overtake Woodhull. Same as many other Long Island and New 
York residents, Woodhull remained mainly moderate during the early years of war and used the 
ambiguous environment to smuggle goods across the Sound. He supported the cause from the 
beginning of the controversy, but the one single event that happened during the Battle of New 
York confirmed his commitment and radicalized his views.  
 General Nathanial Woodhull, who was Abraham’s cousin, was American moderate 
politician who was calling for reconciliation and had refused to sign New York’s endorsement of 
the Declaration of Independence,173and despite all of that, he actively participated in the military 
activities. In August of 1776, Woodhull executed the order to burn and kill everything that 
British might use after they recaptured Long Island but was arrested and wounded by the British 
troops. There are many different accounts of this encounter. One was that he was “wounded on 
the head with a cutlass, and had a bayonet thrust through his arm,” because he did not want to 
give up his sidearm.174 Others claimed that one of the soldiers ordered Woodhull to say, “’ God 
save the King,’ to which Woodhull replied, ‘God save us all,’ whereupon he was assailed by 
Baird’s broadsword.”175 Woodhull even claimed that he was tricked by Major Oliver De Lancey, 
who violated the surrender agreement. One thing we know for sure was that Woodhull was 
harassed by the British, experienced inhumane conditions at the prison and that he died in grave 
pain. This episode would have a tremendous impact on his cousin Abraham Woodhull and his 
decision to accept Tallmadge’s offer and serve the cause. 
 As Alexander Rose argues, in contrast to Tallmadge and Brewster, Woodhull did not see 
a loss during the war as a sacrifice or an ordinary thing that happens during military conflicts; 
instead, he saw it as a murder and a proof of the British barbarism.176 The memories of tyrannical 
British actions, harassment of Setauket residents by the Tory sympathizers, British ignorance of 
the natural rights were coming up in Woodhull’s head and were inducing him to take action. His 
hate of the British and the sense of the urgency of a new free and independent nation were 
getting stronger. “I indevour to collect and convey,” Woodhull told Tallmadge in a letter, dated 
                                                          






April 10, 1779, “the most accurate and explicit intelligence that I possibly can; and hope it may 
be of some service toward alleviating the misery of our distressed Country, nothing but that 
could have induced me to undertake it, for you must readily think it is a life of anxiety to be 
within (on such business) the lines of a cruel and mistrustful Enemy and that I most ardently 
wish and impatiently wait for their departure.”177 He knew he had to serve. Sometimes, however, 
his service became a hostage of his idealistic views, but he showed resilience to the enemy and 
motivated other people to join him. One of those was Robert Townsend. 
 Robert Townsend (aka Samuel Culper Jr.) of the Oyster Bay was born on November 25, 
1753, and his service to the new nation officially started while serving shortly as the commissary 
to Nathaniel Woodhull (yet another connection that might help explain his recruitment by 
Samuel  Culper Sr.), but he “may have been [already] involved with the Sons of Liberty back in 
the early 1770s.”178 He was an intelligent man whose life was interwoven with depression, his 
temperament, contradictions, twist, and turns.  “Half—Quaker, half-Episcopalian, partly secular, 
partly devout, somewhat idealistic, somewhat mercenary,” Rose argues, “Townsend was not 
wholly pacifist nor entirely militant. He was an American who refused to fire a musket for his 
country, a Loyalist who struggled against the British”179 Townsend’s duplicity of life was caused 
by his background.  
 His father, Samuel, whose views were often seen as an antithesis to the traditional 
Quakerism, similarly, was split on the role of Quakerism in his life. He was the Friend only in 
his education.180 Sometimes he would get into trouble for his fondness of luxury items, opinions, 
and desire to be an ordinary colonial. During the Anglo-American struggle, he would protest 
Parliament’s imposition of brutal taxes on the colonies. This, however, did not get him into 
trouble nor he was faced with yet another crisis of conciseness as he was during the French and 
Indian war, because the Quakers, who were often merchants and businessmen, mainly supported 
the protests. The signature of non-importation agreement did not mean support for a military 
conflict. He stayed moderate during the years of non-combat conflict, but with the news of 
Lexington and Concord, he decided to openly argue for the American Independence.181Together 
with his son and Woodhull, he executed the scorch earth order on Long Island, but when the 
British captured Long Island, he was arrested and forced to swear the oath of loyalty to the 
crown. His public advocacy for independence was over. 
 Like many other Patriots living under the British occupation, he externally accepted the 
reality, but internally he supported the cause. His son, who solely focused on his business career 
and the trade deals with both the British and Americans, also “bent his knee,” to the crown after 
the battle to continue with his normal life and business career.182 Why did this man suddenly 
change his mind and decided to risk his life for the cause?  The words of newly arrived fellow 
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Quaker, Thomas Paine, which induced him to serve earlier, in conjunction with the British 
inhumane actions against the residents of Long Island convinced him to accept Woodhull’s offer.  
 Thomas Paine’s work, Common Sense, which was one of the most influential pamphlets 
ever written and was widely circulated during the struggle, provided a refugee to the ordinary 
colonials; its charismatic words did not only reaffirm Patriot’s commitment to the cause but also 
had helped to convince skeptics that the fight was just and requisite. With portraying the British 
King as a tyrant and the whole system of government as a corrupt, Paine defined American 
actions as defensive and ones that every “lover of Mankind” and freedom should support.  “The 
sun never shined,” he described, “on a cause of greater worth…Every quite method for peace 
hath been ineffectual….Wherefore, since nothing but blows will do, for God’s sake, let us come 
to a final separation, and not leave the next generation to be cutting throats, under the violated 
unmeaning names of parent and child.”183  These words echoed an early religious dogma of 
Quakerism that “stressed the responsibility of individuals to participate in the struggle against 
worldly hubris, corruption, and narcissism so that they, too, might live in a paradisiacal, divine 
future.”184 Paine’s words provided American Quakers with hope and strength. It was a much-
needed clarification of the Anglo-American controversies and war. Once they were aware that 
their support of the struggle would not undermine their commitment to Quakerism, the Friends 
looked for a way how to help. However, their leadership disassociated themselves from the work 
and called it a conspiracy.  
 In their proclamation, The Ancient Testimony and the Principles of the People Call’d 
Quakers, they explained that only God has the prerogative to remove a King and that they stand 
firm against “all Plotting, Conspiracies and contriving Insurrections against the King or the 
Government, and against all Treacherous, Barbarous, and Murtherous Designs whatsoever, as 
Works of the Devil and Darkness.”185 Their confirmation of the commitment was a double edge 
sword.  
 Thomas Paine immediately panned their argument and accused them of not being a 
Quaker at all. With explicitly stating and reaffirming that the War for Independence was a 
struggle for peace in his response, Paine influenced even more people, and his work became a 
perpetuum mobile of the American support and recruitment. However, without the British 
draconic policies, arrogant personas and unintended consequences of the mother country’s 
military rule, many people would, similarly as Samuel and Robert Townsend had, hold their 
ideological desires for themselves, pretended to be Tories, waited for and supported the 
reconciliation. Even the conceptualization of the idea and the firm accusation of the Crown in the 
Declaration of Independence did not convince the ordinary, moderate, and quasi-Tories to get 
out onto the streets and fight. The American leadership knew that the victory required a shift in 
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the allegiance. The pro-British and pacifist had to support the cause. But the conditions under the 
British rule provided Patriots with the opportunity to influence and recruit people to their side.  
 Even though many Tory loyalists and even moderates celebrated and welcomed the 
British rule after the Battle of New York, the British did not care about those emotions and did 
not see Long Island nor New York as a liberated territory; instead, they converted it into fortress 
Britannia and introduced the martial law. On one hand, because of the value of the newly 
acquired territory for further actions against the Continental Army, the decision was logical. 
However, on the other, it created an environment in which the British troops were continually 
harassing and preying on colonials and their property. The British would seize personal property, 
food, and other resources with little or no compensation at all, and the locals would have to 
suffer “the needless annoyances, and saw their homes occupied by British officers, some of 
whom had more than one residence.186  
 With people moving from their own homes to someone’s else, and then doing it all over 
again when some other British officer decided to use that house for his private chambers, pro-
American colonials, and especially Loyalists, who were not exempt from the policy, were losing 
patience. Not only that caused the shift in loyalty, but also the presence of a considerable number 
of refugees on their streets and soldiers who were excessively drinking, assaulting women, and 
harassing their husbands.  
 The British, fundamentally, were antagonizing once a friendly relationship and, thus, 
rapidly losing support for their view of the conflict. “The people in general are [were] becoming 
indifferent, if not possible,” said Patrick Ferguson, a Loyalist militia officer, “to a government 
which in place of the liberty, prosperity, safety, and plenty, under promise of which it involved 
them in this war, has established a thorough despotism.”187 The British arrogance had a 
tremendous impact on the population, and the number of Loyalists, who departed with the army 
after the surrender (one in every twenty), shows that many believed that the new government was 
better than the old one.188  
 With colonel Simcoe quartering at his father’s home and the latter’s aggressive behavior 
towards his father and sister, Robert Townsend joined a band of brothers in declaring it was 
enough of undermining the fundamental rights and keeping those frustrations for himself; 
instead, it was a time to strike a silent blow against the British.189 However, the story of 
extraordinary men and women who risked their lives would be incomplete without an account of  
Benedict Arnold, whose actions contradicted not only American ideals but also British 
gentlemanly manners.  
 American General Benedict Arnold whose heroism during the Battle of Saratoga could 
not be matched by any other officer-involved in that battle turned to be the most prominent 
American traitor. With hundreds and hundreds of Americans betraying their country, Benedict 
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Arnold’s treasonous attempt to sell the British the stronghold at West Point and obstruct 
American military plans is still remembered.190 The betrayal in the midst of fight for “life, 
liberty, and pursuit of happiness” could not be easily forgotten. His life was full of twist and 
turns.  
 He was born into an affluent Connecticut family that had righteously earned the respect 
of the community, but their business eventually collapsed, and his father started to drink.191 With 
leadership skills and military predispositions, Arnold, however, was not initially fond of the 
civilian career, but he eventually accepted it as a reality. He worked as an Apotheker and soon 
his profession took him into “the traditional New England trade, practiced by virtually all the 
prominent commercial families and many of the future leaders of the Revolution—smuggling 
products into the colonies to avoid paying the British taxes.”192 It was logically, thus, that he 
joined the local chapter of Sons of Liberty and supported the American cause immediately when 
the Anglo-American controversies started. With the arrival of the news of attacks on Lexington 
and Concord, Arnold was among the first volunteering and calling for forming a militia unit from 
his community members. During the early stages of War, he led his troops aggressively to 
capture the Fort Ticonderoga, Lake Champlain, and successfully managed his unit in other 
important movements against the enemy. Washington considered him as a trusted friend and 
even zealously listened Arnold’s idea of the capture of Canada, the British stronghold that 
refused to support independence which some radicals ascribed to British appeasement to the 
Canadian Catholics.  The campaign, with its primary objective of capturing the city of Quebec, 
was logistically complex and required well-disciplined soldiers and proved to be a failure from 
the beginning. Arnold’s most significant accomplishment, however, arrived when he suddenly 
boosted soldier’s morale, rallied enforcements and bravely commanded troops during the Battle 
of Saratoga, specifically the Battle of Bemis Heights on October 7, 1778, and was wounded in 
the leg. In all examples of Arnold’s extraordinary leadership and military, and even civilian, 
achievements, one Arnold’s trait was always present—his ego.   
 Arnold was selfish and arrogant, and precisely that induced him to betray the American 
cause.193 When the Congress promoted five less experienced senior brigadier generals to major 
generals, Arnold was furies and believed that his country betrayed him. To calm his friend down, 
Washington explained to Arnold that the real motivation behind the promotions was political, not 
one based on merit. To furnish troops with new provisions, the Congress decided that the number 
of officers should be proportional by the state.194 With Connecticut already having two major 
generals, Arnold’s appointed was impossible.  Arnold stubbornly accepted the reality, but he 
remained internally angry on the Congress and their disrespect of his accomplishments.  
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 When Arnold secured the crucial victory at Saratoga, he thought that he would prove to 
the Congress his value and reclaim his seniority, which he did indeed, but his wounded leg 
diminished his combat plans. Washington thus offered him a position of Philadelphia’s military 
commander after the British abandoned the city in 1778. Arnold accepted it and started to plan 
how to administrate the city. Arnold’s arrival to the city, home to the lavish social events during 
the occupation, in mid-June signaled the restoration of American government, the seat of 
Continental Congress, but also the last stage of American respect of that general. He arrived 
physically and psychologically wounded, and disappointed with his life and career, but that did 
not stop him from abandoning yet another characteristic of his—love of money.  
 Since his early campaign days, Arnold’s expenditures and his usage of public money 
were under scrutiny, primarily because he could not provide paperwork to support his expenses. 
To Arnold, this was an attempt by his enemies to discredit his honor and accomplishments.195 
While in Philadelphia, the accusations against him would reemerge. He was living a lavish life 
that was way above his military income and constantly mingling with the Tory residents.196  In 
the city, he met Peggy Shippen, a daughter of Philadelphia’s prominent Loyalist, on whom he 
would spend money on and eventually marry. As Daigler describes, “his [Arnold’s] types of 
commercial activities were not uncommon among many American political and military leaders 
during the war, as some biographers of Arnold note. However, the scope of his activities and 
their transparency made them public knowledge.”197 Arnold would grant specific merchants 
exclusive rights, use military resources to move non-government property, and purchase goods 
left by Tories without opening them for competitive bidding.198 Arnold was using his position for 
an individual benefit which violated Washington’s and government’s ethical standards.  
 The Congress started an official investigation of Arnold’s business dealings in early-
1780, which eventually would result in a court-martial. Even though Arnold asked for 
Washington’s help during the trial, the commander in chief separated himself from his trusted 
friend. That was a final blow to Arnold’s wounded ego. Together with his new wife’s consent, he 
decided to offer his services to the British and permanently relinquish his connections with the 
American side. Arnold instructed Joseph Stansbury, a Philadelphia merchant, and the British 
stay-behind, to travel to New York and request the audience with Sir Henry Clinton and offer 
American senior officer’s services. The Andre-Arnold communication from then was on.  
 “The Heart which is Concious of its Own rectitude,” Arnold wrote to Washington after 
the defection, “Cannot attempt to paliate a Step, which the world may Censure as wrong; I have 
ever acted from a Principle of Love to my Country, since the Commencement of the present 
unhappy Contest between Great Britian and the Colonies… I have no favor to ask for myself, I 
have too often experienced the Ingratitude of my Country to Attempt it.” Benedict Arnold’s ego, 
therefore, like Robert Hanssen’s two hundred years later, interwoven with his love of money and 
sensitivity to the external monitoring of his actions would induce him to betray his country and 
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the cause for which he bravely fought before. Even though he thought his life would be better on 
the British side, he was despised equally by the British and Americans in the post-war life. The 
man with such a big ego died dressed into his old Continental army’s uniform in London on June 
14, 1801.  
 On the other hand, Arnold’s contact in the British military during the controversies, John 
Andre, would be remembered as an honorable young man and admirer of art by both sides who 
found himself on the wrong side at the wrong time. Son of a Swiss merchant and flamboyant 
mother, Andre grew in Geneva and received a liberal education.199 Upon completing his degree, 
he went to London to work for his father, and after his death, Andre bought a military 
commission and departed for America. He was captured by the Patriots during the siege of Fort 
St. James in 1775 but was exchanged after the Battle of New York in 1776. General Howe 
appointed him as his staff officer and translator for the Hessian troops. Howe’s successors, Sir 
Henry Clinton, recognized Andre’s extraordinary virtues and talents and appointed him as his 
adjutant general, an equivalent of today’s chief of staff, and chief intelligence officer.200 Most 
importantly he became Clinton’s closest confidant. In that capacity, he managed British 
intelligence operations and their most crucial asset, Benedict Arnold.  
 Andre was a devoted supporter of the Crown and held a meager opinion of Americans 
and detested those who were disloyal to the king.201 This view probably could explain his 
mistakes and arrogance, especially during his capture.202 Ideology, thus, combined with a desire 
of prestige and advancement motivated Andre to participate in the spy game, but his humility, 
manners, and love for art, poetry, drawing made him approachable and likable even to 
Americans. In his letter to Washington, written immediately after his capture, Andre stated that 
he was branded “with nothing dishonorable, as no motive could be mine but the service of my 
King.” He also expressed that “having avowed myself a British officer, I have nothing to reveal 
but what relates to myself, which is true on the honor of an officer and a gentleman.”203 With the 
dedication of the monument in the Westminster Abbey, a burial ground of many British 
sovereigns, Andre’s virtues and patriotism were romanticized in Britain same as Nathan Hale’s 
were in America.  
 We’ve begun this paper by narrating the story of Nathan Hale and finished our analysis 
with the story about other people, who willingly risked their lives for the end of the British 
tyranny in America and recognition of a new nation, and the answer to the question—why they 
did what they did. The American Revolution was a revolution of men and women who were 
induced by their psychological adjustments and their personal experience to demand the change. 
They organized each other, rallied support for their actions, and deceived the British by sending 
Quakers and women, who were commonly deemed not as a threat, on reconnaissance operations. 
Their strength and zeal could not be matched, and eventually, it would outmaneuver the most 
prominent military, and intelligence, force on the earth. The victory, however, would not be 
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possible without the intelligence help and dedicated members of the Culper Ring who refined the 
meaning of the service and clandestine operations. Their secret of success is not only in their 
always careful approach to intelligence gathering and confirming the credibility of their sources, 
but also on their willingness to make the cause of their country a family business and to serve for 
no compensation at all, except reimbursement. To this day, their service is still unknown to the 
majority of Americans, but with every discovery, the story attracts the attention of millions of 
Americans and educates them about this institution. In the end, however, dear readers, it’s on 
you to judge the importance and credibility of the Culper Ring and its significance. You can 
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